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SOCIAL JUSTICE AND DEPOSIT RETURN 
CALCULATIONS: 
A STUDY OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN 
COMMERCIAL LAW REFORM 
WILLIAM H. WIDEN† 
INTRODUCTION 
The time has come to address ambiguity in the interpretation 
of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) provisions governing the 
return of deposits to defaulting buyers found in subsections 
2-718(2) and (3) of Article 2 governing the sale of goods.1  In brief, 
the concern is that ambiguity in the drafting of UCC § 2-718(2) 
and (3) allows courts to understate the restitution amount 
returnable to a defaulting buyer who made a deposit on a contract 
for the sale of goods.  This mistaken interpretation allows sellers 
to retain a premium or penalty, in addition to compensation for 
actual damages.  Recent case law creates the risk that this 
“penalty” interpretation will become the norm.2  Although the 
 
† Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law, Coral Gables, Florida. 
Professor Widen is a member of the American Law Institute and the New York Bar. 
He practiced business and commercial law for seventeen years in New York City 
before entering the legal academy. Professors Caroline Bradley and Francis Hill 
graciously offered comments on this article. 
1 U.C.C. § 2-718 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018). Section 2-718 
appears in the same form today as it appeared when the official version of the U.C.C. 
was adopted in 1962. Following withdrawal of proposed revisions to U.C.C. Article 2, 
as discussed in this article, the official version of Article 2 reverted to that 
promulgated in 1962 but for a few conforming amendments to Article 2 adopted as 
part of revisions to U.C.C. Article 7 in 2003. Amendments to Article 2 proposed in 
2003 were withdrawn in 2011. The U.C.C. was last amended in 2018 but those 
amendments are not relevant to the matters discussed in this article. The UCC is a 
joint project of the American Law Institute (“ALI”) and the Uniform Law Commission 
(“ULC”). During the bulk of the legislative history discussed herein, the ULC was 
known as the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
(“NCCUSL”). 
2 See infra Part I text accompanying notes 14–33. The troubling cases appear in 
New York. This raises particular concerns. New York decisions command added 
respect around the country in commercial matters because the court system includes 
the Commercial Division, which handles complicated commercial cases as part of the 
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maximum dollar amount of the penalty is, at most, $500 in any 
one case, the “penalty” interpretation nonetheless raises social 
justice concerns that must be addressed. 
Empirical studies show that many Americans are unable to 
pay an unexpected $500 debt.3  Twenty-five percent of American 
families have less than $400 in savings.4  More broadly, in 2017, 
forty percent of adults report that they or their families had 
trouble meeting at least one basic need for food, health care, 
housing or utilities.5  Though $500 may appear small in a legal 
setting—given the myriad court costs, legal fees, and expenses 
associated with any case—social science research shows that the 
loss of this amount would create real economic hardship for many 
individuals and families. 
Given this economic reality, stewardship of the law requires 
that sellers not be overcompensated for their losses unless the 
parties have otherwise agreed to an enforceable liquidated 
damages clause.6  As explained below, neither the language nor 
the history of UCC § 2-718(2) and (3) require the imposition of a 
penalty or premium as part of the UCC’s scheme of default rules.  
Significantly, a proposed amendment to the UCC that would have 
addressed this problem was abandoned.7 
 
Supreme Court of the State of New York. The respect extends beyond those cases 
specifically handled by the Commercial Division. 
3 Maggie McGrath, 63% Of Americans Don't Have Enough Savings to Cover a 
$500 Emergency, FORBES (Jan. 6, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/maggiemcgrath/ 
2016/01/06/63-of-americans-dont-have-enough-savings-to-cover-a-500-emergency. 
4 THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, THE ROLE OF EMERGENCY SAVINGS IN FAMILY 
FINANCIAL SECURITY: WHAT RESOURCES DO FAMILIES HAVE FOR  
FINANCIAL EMERGENCIES? 6 (2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2015/ 
11/emergencysavingsreportnov2015.pdf. 
5 MICHAEL KARPMAN ET AL., MATERIAL HARDSHIP AMONG NONELDERLY ADULTS 
AND THEIR FAMILIES IN 2017 2 (2018), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/ 
publication/98918/material_hardship_among_nonelderly_adults_and_their_families_
in_2017.pdf. 
6 See U.C.C. § 2-718(1). An argument for substantive law reform that limits 
deposit retention and liquidated damages clauses in consumer contracts—regardless 
of any purported agreement—is beyond the scope of this article. For some types of 
transactions, a state consumer protection law may apply. See, e.g., UNIF. CONSUMER 
CREDIT CODE § 2.504 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1968); see also Robert L. Jordan and 
William D. Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 387,  
441 (1968) (discussing home solicitation credit sales). 
7 Recommendation of the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial 
Code to Withdraw the 2003 Amendments to UCC Articles 2 and 2A from the Official 
Text of the Uniform Commercial Code, reprinted in 65 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 150 
(2011). See generally Scott J. Burnham, Thoughts on the Withdrawal of Amended 
Article 2, 52 S. TEX. L. REV. 519 (2011). 
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The following tells a story of how the mechanics of current law 
reform have failed to address problems of particular concern to 
low-income people.  This failure occurs in the shadow of prior 
successes that made the law of deposit returns fairer, but not 
perfect.  In an age of increasing income inequality, it is important 
to understand and address this phenomenon.  The law-making 
process that generated the law appears powerless to fix it.  This 
circumstance raises the larger question of how to address these 
types of problems without derailing large meritorious projects. 
Essentially, there is a fundamental design failure on two 
levels: first, the usage of the law in actual cases does not track the 
practice envisioned by the UCC drafters; and second, the 
traditional amendment process for the UCC is not capable of 
dealing with problems revealed by the operation of the law in 
action when it differs from the usage anticipated by its structure. 
As to the actual usage of the law, it will be shown, in deposit 
return cases, that the UCC appears to be functioning like a civil 
code, not like the “common law” code envisioned by its creators.8  
In practice, courts and parties tend to apply the law following a 
surface reading of the statute, as is done in a civil law system.9  
Use of the UCC as a civil code, treating it as though it is complete 
and gapless, partly explains the erroneous judicial decisions 
relating to deposit return calculations and why the common law 
structure of decision and precedent has failed to correct these 
injustices.10 
Regarding the amendment process, despite enormous effort, 
the traditional law revision procedures orchestrated through the 
ALI and the ULC failed to address the first system-design failure  
 
 
8 See, e.g., John E. Murray, Jr., An Effective Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code: Who is Responsible?, 11 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 123 (2009) (confirming that “[t]here has 
never been any doubt that the Uniform Commercial Code, especially Article 2, was 
not designed as a civil code”). 
9 See generally Gunther A. Weiss, The Enchantment of Codification in the 
Common-Law World, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 435 (2000) (explaining the simple dichotomy 
between civil law and common law, while suggesting the reality is more complex). 
“The ideal was that the code could answer all legal questions and that it would not be 
necessary to fall back on judges’ opinions, customs, or scholarly wisdom.” Id. at 456. 
10 A surface reading of the statute should suffice in a civil law system because its 
ideal form is complete and gapless. “It is often claimed that codification has no gaps. 
Then, it is said, the judge’s role is limited to mechanical application of the code, and 
the judge is, in Montesquieu's words, only the ‘mouthpiece’ of the code.” Id. at 458. 
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when they withdrew the proposed amendment to Article 2.11  The 
cumbersome amendment process itself constitutes a second 
system-design failure. 
Primary blame for the failure to enact revised Article 2 rests 
with state legislatures, influenced by special interests concerned 
with matters unrelated to deposit return calculations.12  The 
shortcomings of the ALI and ULC rest with a structural inability 
to deal with important, but technical, fixes outside of the grand 
amendment.  When the UCC operates as a civil code, the 
conventional apparatus of a Permanent Editorial Board comment, 
ideally suited to certain types of technical corrections, will not 
suffice as a second-best solution if the intended audience does not 
read it. 13 
Accordingly, the case is made for a populist takeover of the 
amendment process, state by state, to correct the social injustice 
of deposit return calculations where established institutions of 
reform have failed.14  Based on the research presented here, the 
most important state for an amendment is New York, since that 
jurisdiction is both influential and the one in which case law has 
advocated for the “penalty” interpretation. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I describes case law 
which uses a “penalty” interpretation for § 2-718(2) and (3).  
Part II describes case law in which courts do not apply a penalty.  
Part III offers a penalty-free interpretation for § 2-718(2) and (3) 
 
11 See Burnham, supra note 7, at 525–27. The failure was not a result of capture 
of the ALI or the ULC by special interest groups. See generally Edward J. Janger, 
Predicting When the Uniform Law Process Will Fail: Article 9, Capture, and the Race 
to the Bottom, 83 IOWA L. REV. 569, 585–86 (1998). 
12 See William H. Henning, Amended Article 2: What Went Wrong?, 11 DUQ. BUS. 
L.J. 131, 133–34 (2008). 
13 The Permanent Editorial Board (“PEB”) is composed of members from the ALI 
and the ULC. It prepares commentaries and advises its member organizations on 
further changes needed to the UCC. Its activities with respect to the UCC are 
governed by an agreement dated July 31, 1986, as amended January 18, 1998, among 
the ALI, ULC, and PEB. Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial 
Code: Agreement Describing the Relationship of the American Law Institute, the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and the Permanent 
Editorial Board with Respect to the Uniform Commercial Code (July 31, 1986), 
https://www.ali.org/media/filer_public/54/d2/54d2249e-61df-4c33-bba7-b539bf8a5b99 
/agreement-peb-ucc.pdf. 
14 The North Carolina legislature is unique in addressing this problem, albeit 
limited to the context of layaway plans. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-718(2)(c). See 
HAWKLAND, UNIF. COM. CODE SERIES, LOCAL CODE VARIATIONS, 2017-2018 EDITION 
366–69 (2017). The North Carolina variation is discussed in Part VI. In fact, the North 
Carolina legislature appears to have botched the amendment. See infra Part VI notes 
and accompanying text. 
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that remains true to the statutory language.  These three parts 
make extensive use of numerical examples and explanations.  
Although the presentation may seem dense in parts, an 
appreciation of the numbers is essential to understanding both the 
problem and the solution. 
Part IV describes the drafting history of § 2-718(2) and (3) to 
support the preferred interpretation.  Understanding how we got 
here motivates the impetus for reform by revealing the complete 
lack of justification for the penalty interpretation.  Part V explains 
that correcting the penalty interpretation has the potential to 
positively impact the lives of many low-income individuals, people 
for whom $500 is by no means a small calculation quibble.  Here, 
structural concerns and system-design failures are discussed as 
important factors in favor of reform.  The Article concludes in Part 
VI with a defense of a populist agenda for a non-uniform 
amendment to the UCC, including an appendix offering the simple 
statutory fix for proposal to state legislatures.  It describes the 
kind of theory of legislation required to advocate for change 
despite the risk that such a change poses for uniformity in the law. 
I. THE ARITHMETIC, CASE LAW, AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION CREATING A PENALTY 
The recent cases adopting the “penalty” interpretation arise 
in New York.  Gongora v. Eye Gallery of Scarsdale is a recent 
example.15  In that case, Gongora brought a small claims action to 
recover a $750 deposit that she provided to Eye Gallery of 
Scarsdale toward the purchase of a pair of eyeglasses for a total 
purchase price of $1,380.16  At trial, defendant proved actual 
damages of $250 from Gongora’s breach, representing the cost of 
lenses which Eye Gallery could not resell.17 
For reasons not explained, the small claims court dismissed 
the action, apparently allowing defendant Eye Gallery of 
Scarsdale to retain the entire $750 deposit.18  The appellate court 
reversed, directing entry of judgment of $224 for Gongora as 
restitution.19  This allowed defendant Eye Gallery to retain $526 
of the deposit, rather than the full $750 amount allowed by the 
trial court. 
 
15 51 Misc. 3d 140(A), 37 N.Y.S.3d 207 (2d Dep’t 2016). 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
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The court properly20 began its analysis by noting that UCC 
§ 2-718 governed the treatment of the deposit: 
Section 2-718 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides, in 
pertinent part, that, in the absence of a contractual provision 
with respect to the liquidation or limitation of damages and the 
return of deposits, 
“(2) Where the seller justifiably withholds delivery of goods 
because of the buyer’s breach, the buyer is entitled to 
restitution of any amount by which the sum of his payments 
exceeds . . .  
(b) . . . twenty per cent of the value of the total performance 
for which the buyer is obligated under the contract or $500, 
whichever is smaller. 
(3) The buyer’s right to restitution under subsection (2) is 
subject to offset to the extent that the seller establishes 
(a) a right to recover damages under the provisions of this 
Article other than subsection (1), and 
(b) the amount or value of any benefits received by the buyer 
directly or indirectly by reason of the contract.”21 
Pursuant to subsection (2)(b), the court determined that 
defendant could retain a base amount of $276.22  The result of the 
twenty percent or $500 calculation under (2)(b) is hereafter called 
the “base retention amount.”  This $276 represents twenty 
percent of the value of total performance owed by Gongora—0.2 x 
$1,380, the value of total performance for which the buyer was 
obligated.  Per the statute, the defendant’s entitlement extends to 
the smaller $276 amount, rather than to the larger $500 amount.  
Considering subsection (2)(b) in isolation, defendant should return 
the balance of the deposit—$474—to Gongora as a restitution 
amount.  However, subsection (2)(b) does not function in isolation. 
Pursuant to subsection (3)(a), the base retention amount 
increases by damages, which the seller may recover under Article 
2 because these damages are an offset, or reduction, to the 
restitution amount owed to the buyer.23  If the total retention 
 
20 The eyeglasses satisfy the UCC definition of a “good.” See U.C.C. § 2-105(1) 
(AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW. COMM’N 2018) (A good includes “all things . . . which are 
movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale.”). Thus, eyeglasses fit 
under the UCC’s scope of coverage. See U.C.C. § 2-102 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW. 
COMM’N 2018) (specifying Article 2 coverage for “transactions in goods”). 
21 Gongora, 51 Misc. 3d 140(A), 37 N.Y.S.3d 207. 
22 Id. 
23 Article 2 generally provides for damages available to a seller, with the special 
case of damages available upon a buyer’s insolvency contained in section 2-702. See 
generally U.C.C. §§ 2-703–2-710 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW. COMM’N 2018). 
2019] SOCIAL JUSTICE AND DEPOSIT RETURN 371 
amount for the seller increases by proof of damages, the restitution 
amount owed to the buyer decreases.  On one reading of the 
statute, the total amount a seller may retain is determined 
pursuant to an additive formula: base retention amount plus 
damages equals total retention amount.  Using the additive 
method of computation, the base retention amount is the premium 
or penalty kept by the seller above actual damages. 
As the appellate court noted, the buyer’s restitution amount 
decreases because it is subject to a reduction by “offset” under 
subsection (3)(a) to the extent that the seller establishes “a right 
to recover damages under the provisions of this Article other than 
subsection (1).”24  Subsection (1) is not relevant here because that 
subsection deals with contracts in which the parties have specified 
a liquidated sum as damages.  The appellate court noted that 
defendant did not prove any damages other than the $250 loss 
related to the lenses, nor had it established that Gongora received 
any other amount or benefit by reason of the contract, so 
subsection (3)(b) did not apply.25 
The additive method used by the appellate court in Gongora 
required that subsection (2)(b) and subsection (3)(a) be applied in 
two separate and unrelated steps.  Under subsection (2)(b), the 
first step determines a base retention amount for the seller.  That 
base retention amount is equal to the lesser of twenty percent of 
the value of total performance and $500.  Having determined the 
base retention amount under subsection (2)(b), the next 
calculation determines whether the seller may establish the right 
to recover damages under another section of Article 2. 
The base retention amount is added to the actual damage 
amount to which the seller may establish a right, creating a total 
retention amount for the seller.  The restitution amount owed to 
the buyer is simply the amount of the deposit minus this total 
retention amount.  On the additive method, the computation of the 
base retention amount has no impact on the actual damage 
amount to which the seller may establish a right under another 
provision of Article 2. 
 
Separate sections provide for damages available to a buyer. See U.C.C. §§ 2-711–2-
717 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW. COMM’N 2018). It is the former seller-directed 
sections to which the UCC refers when it refers to “a right to recover damages under 
the provisions of this Article other than subsection (1).” U.C.C. § 2-718(3)(a) (AM. LAW 
INST. & UNIF. LAW. COMM’N 2018). 
24 U.C.C. § 2-718(3)(a). 
25 Gongora, 51 Misc. 3d 140(A), 37 N.Y.S.3d 207. 
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The Gongora appellate court arguably applied the law 
correctly to the facts, considering each twist and turn in the 
statute.  In allowing the retention of a penalty amount exceeding 
actual damages, the court cited the old precedent of Feinberg v. 
Bongiovi26 to support its computation.  In Feinberg, the plaintiff 
ordered wood from defendant, placing down a deposit of $400.27  
The contract price for the wood ordered was $895.28  The court 
computed twenty percent of the contract price at $179, which is 
less than $500.29  This created a base retention amount of $179.  
However, the seller had incurred a cost of $50 relating to a 
notification given to the woodcutter.30  The notification charge 
appears to be the only damage incurred by the seller, though the 
court does not expressly say so. 
The Feinberg computation of the restitution amount followed 
the Gongora pattern: deposit amount—$400—minus total 
retention amount—$229—equals a restitution amount of $171.  A 
few months after Gongora, the additive method was used in 
McCann v. McSorley.31  In McCann, plaintiff made a deposit of 
$1,800 toward a $3,320 purchase order of canvas slipcovers.32  
After plaintiff repudiated his order, the court computed 
restitution: 
[S]ubstantial justice (see UDCA 1804, 1807) requires that 
plaintiff be awarded his $1,800 deposit, less $500 (which is the 
smaller amount pursuant to UCC 2-718[2][b]), and less $600 in 
damages that defendant established pursuant to UCC 
2-718(3)(a), for a total award in the principal sum of $700 in favor 
of plaintiff on his cause of action.33 
Starting with Feinberg and extending to the recent decisions 
of Gongora and McCann, New York courts have employed a 
consistent approach—the additive method—to determine the 
restitution amount owed to a defaulting buyer who has made a  
 
 
 
 
 
26 110 Misc. 2d 379, 442 N.Y.S.2d 399 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk Cnty. 1981). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 380, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 399. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 53 Misc. 3d 48, 39 N.Y.S.3d 583 (2d Dep’t 2016). 
32 Id. at 49, 39 N.Y.S.3d at 585. 
33 Id. at 51, 39 N.Y.S.3d at 586. 
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deposit.  This calculation method creates a premium or penalty in 
most cases.34  This consistency, however, violates binding 
precedent in New York, as explained in Part II. 
II. CASE LAW WITH NO PENALTY OR PREMIUM 
Courts do not universally apply the additive method to 
compute deposit return amounts under UCC § 2-718(2) and (3).  
Most courts simply perform the calculation without including a 
penalty, by implication rejecting the additive method, but 
unfortunately often without any explanation of the statutory basis 
for the calculation. 
The courts in Gongora, Feinberg, and McCann were erroneous 
in their application of the additive method; indeed, this 
methodology is directly contrary to the method utilized by the New 
York Court of Appeals in the case of Neri v. Retail Marine Corp.35  
The courts in Gongora, Feinberg, and McCann might have 
followed the calculation method used by the highest court in New 
York, but they did not.36 
In Neri, the plaintiffs agreed to purchase a boat for the price 
of $12,587.40, making a deposit of $4,250.37  The trial court allowed 
the defendant seller to keep $500 and directed it to return the 
balance of the deposit, or $3,750, to plaintiff.38  The trial court 
treated subsection (2)(b) as a stand-alone provision, ignoring the 
possibility contained in subsection (3)(a) that the restitution 
amount might be reduced to the extent that a defendant can show 
damages under another section of Article 2. 
 
 
 
 
34 A premium or penalty will not exist if the actual damages proved equal or 
exceed the total amount of the deposit. 
35 30 N.Y.2d 393, 334 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1972). 
36 The Court of Appeals interpreted subsection (3)(a) to provide an “alternative” 
to the retention of $500 under subsection (2)(b), at least strongly implying—if not 
outright holding—that use of the additive method is improper. This makes the cases 
of Gongora, Feinberg, and McCann harder to understand because the Court of Appeals 
is binding precedent. A Missouri court cited Neri and the alternative approach with 
approval; however, it remanded the case for further proceedings. Anheuser v. Oswald 
Refractories Co., Inc., 541 S.W.2d 706, 712 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976). 
37 Neri, 30 N.Y.2d at 396, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 166–67. 
38 Id. at 397, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 167. 
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The record showed defendant suffered damages of $3,253, 
consisting of $2,579 in lost profits39 and incidental damages of 
$674.40  The court computed the restitution amount due to plaintiff 
as follows: deposit amount—$4,250—minus actual damages—
$3,253—equals a restitution amount of $997.  Significantly, the 
court did not allow defendant to retain an additional penalty as 
was permitted in Gongora, Feinberg, and McCann—no base 
retention amount for the seller was included in the calculation.  
Had it done so, plaintiff would have been entitled to a smaller 
restitution amount of $497 because the penalty would have 
equaled $500—that is, 0.2 x $12,587.40 = $2,517.48—which is 
greater than $500, so $500 would have been used as the base 
retention amount. 
The Neri court applied UCC § 2-718, but explained little else: 
As above noted, the trial court awarded defendant an offset in the 
amount of $500 under paragraph (b) and directed restitution to 
plaintiffs of the balance.  Section 2-718, however, establishes, in 
paragraph (a) of subsection (3), an alternative right of offset in 
favor of the seller, as follows: ‘(3) The buyer’s right to restitution 
under subsection (2) is subject to offset to the extent that the 
seller establishes (a) a right to recover damages under the 
provisions of this Article other than subsection (1)’. 41 
The Neri court stated that subsection (3)(a) is an “alternative” 
but did not explain why it is not “additive,” as lower New York 
courts would later construe the statute.42  The statutory language, 
however, appears to contemplate that subsections (2)(b) and (3)(a) 
work together and not in the alternative. 
The calculation method used in Neri, however, is consistent 
with dicta in a prior New York Court of Appeals case in which the 
Court describes the operation of § 2-718(2) and (3): 
That does not necessarily mean, however, that [the seller] would 
be entitled to retain as against [the buyer] only $500 of the 
$217,279.66 which was [the buyer]’s part payment on these 
contracts.  The Uniform Commercial Code allows the seller actual 
damages where liquidated damages have not been 
stipulated . . . .  Manifestly, if [the buyer] defaulted on these 
 
39 The Neri case is most famous for its explanation of when and why lost profits 
may form an element of damages under Article 2 for a lost volume seller and appears 
in many contracts casebooks. See Mark Pettit, Jr., Exercising with Neri v. Retail 
Marine Corp., 44 ST. LOUIS L.J. 1487 (2000) (naming casebooks which use Neri). 
40 Neri, 30 N.Y.2d at 401, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 171. 
41 Id. at 397, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 168 (emphasis supplied). 
42 Id. 
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contracts, [the seller] was entitled to retain as against [the buyer] 
so much of the $217,279.66 part payment as would be necessary 
to offset its damages due to a falling market plus incidental 
damages, such as extra transportation, storage, legal expense, 
and other items to which it was subjected by [the buyer]’s 
default.43 
It is clear that the Court of Appeals does not endorse the additive 
method because it makes no mention of a base retention amount 
to which actual damages are added.  The court simply states that 
actual damages would be satisfied out of the prior payments.44 
The Neri case is not unique in failing to allow a seller to retain 
both a penalty and its actual damages.  In a Florida case, Honsberg 
v. Lystra,45 the court apparently rejected the additive method.  In 
Honsberg, plaintiffs made a $10,000 deposit towards the purchase 
of a mobile home costing a total of $28,000.46  The trial court 
determined actual damages of $4,826.26, leaving a deposit balance 
of $5,173.74.47  The appellate court ordered this balance returned 
to the breaching buyer as restitution.48 
Note that if the Florida appellate court had followed the 
additive method used in Gongora, Feinberg, and McCann, the 
court would have first identified a base retention amount for the 
seller—which, on these facts, would have been $500.  Then it 
would have added the actual damages to the base retention 
amount, arriving at a total retention amount of $5,326.26.  
Subtracting this from the deposit of $10,000, the restitution 
amount should have been $4,673.74, and not $5,173.74. 
Unfortunately, the Honsberg court does not explain how its 
calculation complies with § 2-718.  It simply states that the 
contract was “not a provision for liquidated damages.”49  Because 
the Honsberg contract did not contain a liquidated damages 
clause, subsection (2)(b) would seem to apply, allowing the seller 
to keep the base retention amount.  This would put the additive 
method in play, had the court adopted it. 
 
 
 
43 Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co. v. Lawrence Am. Field Warehousing Corp., 16 
N.Y.2d 344, 354–55, 266 N.Y.S.2d 785, 792–93 (1965). 
44 Id., 266 N.Y.S.2d at 793. 
45 410 So. 2d 661 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). 
46 Id. at 662. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
376 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:365   
The relevant provision of the Honsberg contract stated: 
5.  Upon failure or the refusal of the purchaser to complete said 
purchase within 30 days of contract date, or an agreed extension 
therefor for any reason (other than cancellation on account of 
increase in price) the cash deposit may have such portion of it 
retained as will reimburse the dealer for expenses and other losses 
including attorney fees occasioned by purchaser’s failure to 
complete said purchase.  In the event a used car, trailer or 
mobilehome [sic] has been taken in trade, the purchaser hereby 
authorizes the dealer to sell said property, at public or private 
sale, and to deduct from the proceeds thereof a sum equal to the 
expenses and losses incurred, or suffered, by the dealer by reason 
of purchaser’s failure to complete the transaction.  Dealer shall 
have all the rights of a seller, upon breach of contract, under the 
Uniform Commercial Code 2–708, 2–710, 2–718, of the Uniform 
Sales Act (as applicable).50 
The court analyzed paragraph 5 of the contract as follows: 
“This is not a provision for liquidated damages. It is, in fact, 
exactly the opposite.  Simply put, paragraph 5 says that the 
deposit shall constitute a fund securing to the seller the actual 
amount of damages he sustains by reason of buyers’ failure or 
refusal to complete the purchase.”51 
There are two ways to read Honsberg in light of this contract 
section and the court’s statement.  A proponent of the additive 
method might say that the additive method is still an appropriate 
calculation in Florida, despite Honsberg, because the actual 
contract language should be interpreted to limit the use of the 
deposit to only that which will reimburse the “dealer for expenses 
and other losses.”52  On this reading, because the contract 
language itself limits the retention amount to actual damages, it 
overrides any generally applicable statutory method allowing for 
a penalty in addition to actual damages—or so the proponents of 
the additive method might argue. 
The problem with this reading of Honsberg is that the contract 
states at the end of paragraph 5 that “Dealer shall have all the 
rights of a seller, upon breach of contract, under the Uniform 
Commercial Code 2-708, 2-710 and 2-718 . . . .”53  If § 2-718 is 
properly read by Gongora, Feinberg, and McCann to provide the 
aggrieved seller with a premium or penalty, then the dealer in 
 
50 Id. (emphasis added). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
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Honsberg should have received it per the express contract 
language referencing § 2-718, notwithstanding the earlier mention 
in that clause of “dealer for expenses and other losses.”54  Seen this 
way, the contract language makes clear that the deposit will be 
used to secure payment of actual damages, but it does not say that 
this is the exclusive use to which the deposit may be applied.  
Indeed, quite the opposite is true by its reference to § 2-718. 
While the matter is not clear given the brevity of the court’s 
remarks, the reading of Honsberg pursuant to which the court 
rejects the additive method is preferred because, if the court read 
§ 2-718 to require the additive method, the contract language 
would give the dealer the benefit of the premium or penalty by 
virtue of paragraph 5’s express reference to § 2-718.  That is to say, 
Honsberg is consistent with Neri and not simply inapplicable to 
the question. 
Interestingly, a more recent federal district court applying 
Florida law did not use the additive method either: “In total, 
Validsa suffered $40,764,093.30 in damages.  After considering the 
$44,580,576.00 in advances that Defendants paid Validsa, the 
Court finds that Defendants are entitled to recover 
$3,816,482.70.”55 
While the district court did not use the additive method, the 
$500 premium or penalty which it declined to include in its 
calculation is most likely a mere rounding error given the very 
large deposit and damages.  In the absence of an explanation for 
the calculation, we can infer that the court did not approve of the 
additive method; however, it is difficult to place much credence on 
this case, considered in insolation, since $500 in the context of such 
large figures is quite insignificant.  Similarly, courts outside 
Florida also have used the alternative approach and, in so doing, 
have apparently rejected the additive method.56 
 
54 Id. 
55 Validsa, Inc. v. PDVSA Servs. Inc., No. 08-21682-CV, 2010 WL 411019, at *12 
(S.D. Fla. Jan. 29, 2010), aff’d, 424 Fed. App’x 862 (11th Cir. 2011) (emphasis omitted). 
Defendants would have recovered $500 less if the court had applied the  
additive method. 
56 See Anheuser v. Oswald Refractories Co., 541 S.W.2d 706 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) 
(applying Missouri law); Madsen v. Murrey & Sons Co., 743 P.2d 1212 (Utah 1987) 
(applying Utah law); Conister Trust Ltd. v. Boating Corp. of America, No. M1998-
00949-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 389864, (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2002) (applying 
Tennessee law); Bowen v. Gardner, 425 S.W.3d 875 (Ark. Ct. App. 2013) (applying 
Arkansas law). 
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III. A THIRD PATH: THE CONTEXT SENSITIVE INTERPRETATION 
The revelation of two different readings for UCC § 2-718(2) 
and (3) is not new to the academic literature.  Professor Pettit 
noted the problem in a law review article illustrating how Neri 
might be used in teaching an introductory contracts course.57  
Though the article is styled as a dialogue—and no definitive 
conclusion is reached other than to note the ambiguity—it appears 
that Pettit favors the additive method because it better accounts 
for the statutory language.  In his view, the choice is between the 
additive method and a reading which treats the statute as 
requiring application of either subsection (2)(b) or subsection 
(3)(a), but not both.  Call this second option the “alternative” 
approach, as was done in Neri.58 
Under the alternative approach, a seller must either accept 
the base retention amount computed under subsection (2)(b) or, 
alternatively, retain only that portion of the deposit that 
represents an offset for its actual damages under subsection (3)(a).  
If those were the only two possible interpretations, the additive 
method tracks the language better than the alternative approach 
as a matter of statutory construction. 
As drafted, there is no indication that one should apply either 
subsection (2)(b) or subsection (3)(a), but not both; indeed, to 
provide an “offset” to the restitution amount in subsection (2)(b), 
as required by subsection (3)(a), the two subsections must work 
together, not separately.  The alternative approach, while creative, 
does not track the statute well for this reason—though one can 
look to the Neri case as precedent.  Indeed, the cases that apply 
the alternative approach rather than the additive method need to 
explain better why a base retention amount is not included, as 
apparently required by subsection (2)(b). 
There is, however, a third way to read the statute which, in 
most cases, does not result in the retention of a premium or 
penalty.  Call this calculation method the “context-sensitive” 
method.  This approach generally produces the same result as the 
alternative approach arithmetically.  It differs, however, in its 
explanation for how that result is achieved, while giving a more 
natural reading to the statutory language. 
 
 
57 See Pettit, supra note 39, at 1497. 
58 See supra text accompanying note 39. 
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The context sensitive method computes the damages that a 
seller has “a right to recover” under subsection (3)(a) after and in 
light of the prior computation of the basic retention amount under 
subsection (2)(b).  For example, if one computes a basic retention 
amount of $500 under subsection (2)(b), this $500 amount is 
considered when computing the amount of actual damages that a 
seller has a right to recover under subsection (3)(a).  The amount 
of damages computed under subsection (3)(a) includes only 
damages in excess of the base retention amount.  A seller holding 
a deposit that exceeds its actual damages cannot prove a right to 
recover more.  This is because subsection (2)(b) does not create an 
absolute or abstract entitlement in the seller. 
The context sensitive method treats damages provable under 
Article 2 as reduced by the basic retention amount because one 
should not double count—and prove as damages—an amount for 
which provision already has been made.  To illustrate using the 
facts of Feinberg, with a base retention amount of $179, the 
woodcutter could not prove an additional $50 in damages under 
another part of Article 2 because that element of damages is 
already covered by the $179 base retention amount.  While in 
possession of $179, the woodcutter has no additional right to 
recover under another part of Article 2. 
The context sensitive method has the benefit of tracking the 
statutory language and yet, in most cases, will not result in the 
seller retaining a premium or penalty.  The only circumstance in 
which a premium or penalty might be retained in the context 
sensitive method is a case in which the base retention amount 
exceeds the amount of actual, provable damages.59  However, it 
does not force a court to pick between application of subsection 
(2)(b) and subsection (3)(a)—both sections are applied—and one 
can achieve the Neri result without having to agree that 
subsection (3)(a) is an “alternative” to subsection (2)(b). 
Using the facts of McCann, we can illustrate the elimination 
of the penalty or premium.  There, the base retention amount was 
$500, and the actual damages were $600, with a total deposit of 
$1,800.60  In the context sensitive method, the seller would retain 
its base retention amount of $500 under subsection (2)(b).  
However, the seller would, in light of that retention, only be able 
to establish a right to recover an additional $100 as damages, and 
 
59 In such a case, subsection (2)(b) operates as a statutorily created liquidated 
damages clause, as explained in infra Part IV at text accompanying note 129. 
60 McCann v. McSorley, 53 Misc. 3d 48, 39 N.Y.S.3d 583 (2d Dep’t 2016). 
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not $600.  The additional $100 in damages is offset under 
subsection (3)(b), reducing the restitution amount, and increasing 
the retention amount to $600.  The seller is compensated for its 
actual losses, but not more, on these facts. 
We can use the facts of Feinberg to illustrate the case of 
premium or penalty retention using the context sensitive 
calculation method.  In Feinberg, the base retention amount was 
computed at $179.61  The actual damages were $50.62  Using the 
context sensitive computation method, the seller would simply 
retain the base retention amount of $179 without an increase for 
the actual damages.  The interpretive theory is that, in light of the 
retention of $179, the seller could not establish any damages under 
another section of Article 2.  Yet, a premium or penalty is still 
retained because the base retention amount of $179 is greater 
than the actual damages of $50.  A similar result obtains in 
Gongora because the base retention amount of $276 exceeds the 
actual damages of $250.  Although, on those facts, the premium is 
reduced to a mere $26.  The context sensitive method has the 
salutary effect of eliminating penalties and premiums in many 
cases, while reducing it, oftentimes substantially, in others. 
An expansive use of the context sensitive approach in a case 
like Feinberg might apply the offset more broadly, allowing the 
proof of actual damages to serve as an offset to reduce the base 
retention amount to $50.  This expansive approach requires that 
the contemplated offset might be positive or negative.  Allowing 
the offset to be a negative number is a less natural reading of the 
term “offset.”  The expansive use of the context sensitive method 
produces a lower retention amount for the seller than the 
alternative approach because, in the alternative approach, the 
seller simply elects to retain the higher base retention amount. 
While appealing as a matter of justice, the more expansive 
reading of the context sensitive method creates the odd 
circumstance of penalizing the seller for failing to demonstrate 
actual damages equal to at least the base retention amount.  As 
nothing compels a seller to attempt to prove actual damages, it 
places a seller in a better position for having proved nothing.  
Santos v. DeBellis63 illustrates this fact pattern.  In Santos v. 
 
61 Feinberg v. Bongiovi Contracting, 110 Misc. 2d 379, 380, 442 N.Y.S.2d 399 
(Dist. Ct. Suffolk Ctny. 1981). 
62 Id. 
63 28 Misc. 3d 48, 901 N.Y.S.2d 457 (2d Dep’t 2010). The fact pattern of the mobile 
home purchase illustrates that even low-income persons make some large dollar 
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DeBellis, the plaintiff made a $6,000 deposit on the purchase of a 
$33,000 mobile home and then defaulted on the purchase.64  The 
defendant did not prove any actual damages.65  The court allowed 
the defendant to retain $500 and required the return of $5,500 to 
the plaintiff.66 
While the context sensitive method tracks the statutory 
language well—until one applies an expansive reading—it is 
particularly appealing considering the odd and haphazard results 
of the additive method.  In Gongora, the seller was 
overcompensated for its loss by $276, an amount exceeding its 
actual damages and, indeed, amounting to more than fifty percent 
of the total recovery for the seller.  In McCann, the seller was 
overcompensated by $500, an amount equal to forty-five percent of 
the total recovery.  Alarmingly, in Feinberg, the seller was 
overcompensated by $179, a figure that represents a massive 
seventy eight percent of the total recovery.  All three of these cases 
present instances of unjust enrichment; moreover, the results of 
each case are at odds with the general theory of contract damages, 
that an innocent party should be compensated for its loss, but no 
more.67 
Beyond the avoidance of unjust results that violate basic 
principles of contract law, four additional considerations support 
the context sensitive method.  First, the UCC expressly rejects the 
imposition of penalties in the immediately preceding subsection, 
§ 2-718(1), when the statute states that a liquidated damages 
provision will not be enforced if it amounts to a penalty.68  Consider 
how nonsensical it would be to expressly disallow a penalty in  
 
 
 
purchases that might trigger the loss of $500 as a penalty. Mobile home and 
automobile purchases often bring the full $500 penalty into play. Indeed, a low-income 
person might well make a mobile home purchase in an attempt to obtain more 
affordable housing. Further, while at first blush an expensive eyeglass purchase as in 
Gongora may not generate immediate sympathy, increasing costs of medical-related 
expenses make the $500 penalty a genuine social justice issue as well. 
64 Id. at 49, 901 N.Y.S.2d 457. 
65 Id. at 48, 901 N.Y.S.2d 457. 
66 Id. at 49, 901 N.Y.S.2d 457. 
67 See E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1145, 1159 (1970). 
68 U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018). Among other 
circumstances, a liquidated damages formula creates a penalty when it always awards 
the non-defaulting party more than actual damages. See Lake River Corp. v. 
Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1290 (7th Cir. 1985). 
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§ 2-718(1) and then to subsequently provide for a penalty by 
operation of subsections 2-718(2) and (3) which immediately 
follow. 
Second, UCC § 1-305 states that penal damages are not 
allowed “except as specifically provided in [the Uniform 
Commercial Code] or by other rule of law.”69  While the operation 
of subsections 2-718(2) and (3) could represent an instance in 
which the drafters of the UCC intended to apply a penalty, 
notwithstanding the fact that penalties are generally disfavored 
for liquidated damages, a perfectly natural reading of the 
statutory language exists which does not create these inconsistent 
results. 
Third, consider a case in which the actual damages exceed the 
deposit amount.  In that case, the seller will be permitted to bring 
a lawsuit for the shortfall.  The deposit simply functions as an 
offset or credit against the damages that may be proved in excess 
of the deposit.  The seller does not retain an extra $500 in this 
case, suggesting that the base retention amount does not create an 
independent entitlement.  This is a natural methodology.  
Importantly, the context sensitive method simply mirrors this 
general approach by allowing the proof of damages only to the 
extent that those damages exceed the base retention amount.  One 
might analogize the base retention amount as a kind of security 
out of which damages are paid, just as the overall deposit functions 
as a kind of security out of which damages may be paid. 
Fourth, a leading treatise on the UCC contains a description 
of the deposit return calculations that can support the context 
sensitive method: 
Section 2-718(3) then provides that if the seller is entitled to 
recover additional damages, that is, no enforceable liquidated 
damages provision under Section 2-718(1), the seller can offset 
those damages against the amount the buyer has already paid.  
This is in addition to the minimal amount of damages stated in 
Section 2-718(2)(b).70 
 
69 U.C.C. § 1-305 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018) (alterations  
in original). 
70 See HAWKLAND ET AL., 2 HAWKLAND UCC SERIES, § 2-718:2 (2019) (emphasis 
added) [hereinafter HAWKLAND]. Note the bias implicit in the characterization of the 
subsection (2)(b) amount as “minimal.” Such an amount is not minimal for a large 
number of individuals and families. See infra Part V text accompanying note 157. 
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The treatise editors cite the additive method cases without 
comment or criticism.  However, the language of the treatise 
summary is consistent with the context sensitive method. 
The treatise refers to the amount recovered under subsection 
(2)(b) as a “minimal amount of damages.”  The amount recovered 
under subsection (3)(a) is described as “additional damages.”  
Though the treatise uses the language of “addition” in its 
description, note that the treatise description contemplates 
adding damages to damages.  When adding damages to damages, 
one should not double count. 
The problem with the additive method used in Gongora, 
Feinberg, and McCann is that the base retention amount is simply 
treated as a generic amount to which the seller is entitled.  Then 
damages are separately computed pursuant to subsection (3)(a) to 
which the base retention amount is added.  However, if you treat 
the base retention amount as representing minimal damages—at 
least in cases for which damages exceed the base retention 
amount71—then those minimal damages should not be included a 
second time when computing the additional damages recoverable 
pursuant to subsection (3)(a). 
The capstone in support of the context sensitive method comes 
from an analysis of the legislative history behind § 2-718 which is 
described below in Part IV. 
IV. WHERE DID THE TWENTY PERCENT OR $500 FORMULATION 
COME FROM? 
The interpretive procedure followed here disregards the 
statement often prefacing draft versions of the UCC: “Proposed 
statutory language may not be used to ascertain the intent or 
meaning of any promulgated final statutory proposal.”72  Part IV  
 
 
 
71 When damages do not exceed the base retention amount, the base retention 
amount functions like a statutorily created liquidated damages amount. See infra Part 
IV text accompanying note 130. 
72 See, e.g., REVISION OF UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 2 – SALES (AM. L. 
INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. LAWS 1999). Karl Llewellyn 
likely would have stopped analysis with Part III. He was against a deep dive into 
legislative history as a mode of analysis for the UCC, preferring to use only the final 
draft and its official annotations. See 1 AM. L. INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS 
ON UNIF. ST. LAWS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTS xvi (Elizabeth Slusser Kelly 
ed. 1984) (“He did not want litigators to look behind the terminology of the Code to 
the discussions and versions which preceded the final Code language.”). 
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ignores this edict by considering proposed statutory language, 
related reporters’ commentary, notes, annotations, prior statutes, 
and the like. 
The reason for this interpretive approach is simple—
§ 2-718(2) is an awkwardly drafted provision.  While it can be 
interpreted in isolation, a fuller understanding of the section can 
be attained when one looks at where it came from and why it was 
drafted.  This requires consideration of its history, rather than 
merely considering the final statutory language and official 
comments. 
There is a rich and deep literature about the theory of 
interpretation of legal materials.73  However, reference to an 
interpretive theory in this case would be unhelpful, primarily for 
three reasons.  First, the suggested context sensitive method is 
available from a surface reading of the statute.74  Second, 
justification for use of the context sensitive method to apply the 
statute to facts makes no appeal to any specific canons of statutory 
construction.75  Third, the purpose behind the legislative review 
that follows amounts to negative assurance—there is nothing in 
the legislative history to suggest another interpretation.  This 
review does not aim to search outside the statutory text for 
interpretive clues.76 
Section 2-718 as currently enacted derives from two separate 
legislative processes: the New York legislature’s effort to 
harmonize the treatment given to defaulting sellers and defaulting 
 
73 See, e.g., William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 
HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1081 (2017); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and 
Normative Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 531 (2013) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA 
& BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012)). 
74 This is not a case in which appeal must be made to a matter outside the 
statutory text, risking implementing a policy not approved by the legislature. See 
Peter A. Alces & David Frisch, Commenting on “Purpose” in the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 419, 440 (1997). 
75 Except, perhaps, for a principle to avoid doing inconsistent things—hardly a 
rule of thumb worthy of its own legal category. 
76 See Alces & Frisch, supra note 74, at 432–34. What matters for this exercise is 
whether the analysis is persuasive and informative. Does it make one more confident 
in the recommended application of the statute, or less confident? Whether the 
approach is an exercise in “construction” or “interpretation,” textualist or purposivist, 
or something else altogether, are categories of questions of only secondary importance. 
If labels matter, perhaps call the approach followed here “legal voyeurism”—being 
curious about the statute beyond the plain meaning of the text. 
2019] SOCIAL JUSTICE AND DEPOSIT RETURN 385 
buyers in sale of goods transactions under New York law;77 and the 
effort, led by Karl Llewellyn, to revise the Uniform Sales Act.78  
The project to revise the Uniform Sales Act, also under the 
direction of Llewellyn, evolved into the creation of Article 2 of the 
UCC.79  What follows is a story of an initial legislative success 
which vastly improved the treatment of deposits for defaulting 
buyers.  Yet, in the current law reform structure, the system is 
incapable of moving forward with further improvements. 
The particular concern over treatment of deposits originated 
in New York.80  The revised Uniform Sales Act project sought to 
address the treatment of deposits, following New York’s lead.81  
The treatment of deposits by Llewellyn’s team carried over from 
the revised Uniform Sales Act process to the drafting of Article 2.82 
In 1952, New York finally enacted an amendment to its 
Personal Property Law in the form of § 145-a, to remove the 
inconsistency between treatment of sellers and buyers in sale of 
goods transactions.83  A note to the 1952 session law explained: 
Under the Sales Act (Personal Property Law, § 125 (1)), if a seller 
of goods fails to deliver all of the goods contracted for, he may 
nevertheless recover for the goods delivered which the buyer 
keeps.  But if a buyer defaults after paying part of the price, he 
may not recover the price he has paid even where it exceeds the 
damages caused to the seller by the default, and even though the 
buyer has received no benefit from the transaction.  The purpose 
of the amendment is to remove this inconsistency between the 
remedies of a buyer of goods who defaults after part performance 
and a seller of goods who defaults after part performance.84 
 
 
77 New York commissioned a study of the law governing restitution at the 
direction of Edwin W. Patterson. See STATE OF NEW YORK: REPORT OF THE LAW 
REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1942, at 195 (N.Y. 1942). 
78 See REPORT AND SECOND DRAFT, THE REVISED UNIFORM SALES ACT (1944), 
reprinted in UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE CONFIDENTIAL DRAFTS (Elizabeth Slusser 
Kelly ed. 1995) (listing Karl Llewellyn as the Reporter). 
79 See U.C.C. cmt. at 3 (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L. CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. 
STATE LAW, Proposed Final Draft 1950) (listing Karl Llewellyn as the Reporter). 
80 See STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR 
1943, S. 227-229, Assemb. 215-217, at 23 (N.Y. 1943). 
81 See infra text accompanying note 113. 
82 See infra text accompanying note 121. 
83 Act of April 19, 1952, ch. 823, 1952 N.Y. Laws 1789. 
84 Id. (noting in margin “Personal Property Law, s. 145-a added”). The purpose, 
as stated, does not refer to a premium or penalty; rather, it contemplates a return to 
the buyer of the amount of the deposit in excess of damages sustained by the seller. 
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The inconsistency in treatment for sellers and buyers arose 
from an amendment to New York law in 1911—which created the 
provision in the New York Sales Act § 125(1)—allowing a recovery 
for a defaulting seller.85  Statutory fixes, however, were needed to 
maintain consistent treatment for both sellers and buyers because 
common law—particularly as strictly applied by New York 
courts—did not allow a defaulting party to maintain a suit for 
recovery of unjust enrichment in a sale of goods transaction, in 
quasi-contract or as restitution.86 
Though the fix for sellers preceded the fix for buyers by over 
forty years, this may not be a simple case of the merchant lobby 
taking care of its own concerns first.  Rather, the problem for 
buyers became more acute with the rise of layaway plans, a 
practice which arose after World War I and continued as a popular 
method to purchase goods, at least until the widespread use of 
credit cards.87  In a layaway plan, the buyer makes a series of 
deposits with a seller for application towards the purchase price.  
When the amount deposited equals the purchase price, payment 
for the good is complete, and the seller delivers the good to the 
buyer. 
At common law, if the buyer never completed its series of 
deposits towards the purchase price, the amounts previously paid 
were forfeit.  In our modern world of Amazon, eBay, and large big 
box retailers, the practice may seem foreign or quaint to some, 
given the almost instant availability of a product, though 
remnants of the practice exist today, particularly for lower income 
groups.88 
 
85 This occurred as part of the adoption by New York of the Uniform Sales Act in 
1911. The model Uniform Sales Act was promulgated in 1906. See Robert Braucher, 
The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 798, 799 
(1958) (listing predecessor legislation to the UCC). 
86 See REPORT OF THE LAW REVIEW COMMISSION FOR 1942, supra note 77, at 195. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 374 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) recognizes a right 
to restitution for defaulting parties. The position of the ALI regarding every type of 
restitution now is found in RESTATEMENT THIRD, RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT (AM. LAW INST. 2011). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 374 
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981) blandly and briefly refers to UCC § 2-718(2): “The case of 
defaulting buyer of goods is governed by Uniform Commercial Code § 2-718(2), which 
generally allows restitution of all but an amount fixed by that section.” 
87 See Will Kenton, Layaway, INVESTOPEDIA (last updated June 25, 2019), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/layaway.asp. 
88 Layaway plans experience a resurgence in economic hard times. See Louis 
Hyman, Laid Flat by Layaway, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/10/12/opinion/wal-marts-layaway-plan.html. (describing layaway plans as not 
being in the best interest of consumers). Layaway plans lock in a price, avoid the need 
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New York law made a distinction between deposits given for 
different purposes.  A deposit given for application towards the 
price of the good was forfeit when a buyer breached, creating a 
particular problem for layaway plans, but also potentially 
applicable to other transactions.89  In contrast, a buyer might 
recover a deposit made as security, after satisfaction of damages 
owed to the seller for the breach.90  Courts often simply used the 
term “deposit” to refer to a deposit made as security and referred 
to a deposit made toward the purchase price as a “down” or “part 
payment.”91 
The theory behind the distinction between a deposit for the 
price and a deposit for security was that, by its very nature, a 
security deposit was made to satisfy damages, but not more.92  In 
practice, courts had difficulty determining the purpose behind 
deposits in many cases,93 though not in the case of layaway plans.  
Because payment of the price is the very purpose for the layaway 
plan, such plans were particularly vulnerable to application of the 
common law rule. 
 
for credit, and assure the availability of the product. One niche area where reserving 
a product may be important is women’s fashions in which product designs change each 
year. A layaway reserves a fashion item that may not be available at a later date. I 
am grateful to Professor Francis Hill for this example. However, layaway plans 
currently are available at large retailers, such as Walmart, for all types of products, 
and with a particular emphasis on Christmas shopping. See Layaway, Returns in 
2019. See you then! WALMART (last visited July 19, 2019), https://www.walmart. 
com/cp/Layaway/1088466. For general shopping needs, use of a layaway plan may be 
a matter of necessity and not of convenience—for example, if a low-income person does 
not have access to a credit card. Layaway plans may be subject to specific state or  
local legislation. See Offering Layaways, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (last visited  
Aug. 25, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/offering-
layaways#4. 
89 Bisner v. Mantell, 92 N.Y.S.2d 825, 827 (City Ct. of Troy 1949) (discussing a 
layaway plan). 
90 Petito v. Aiello, 181 Misc. 371, 371, 47 N.Y.S.2d 447, 447 (2d Dep’t 1944) (per 
curiam). 
91  
The law is well settled that the only time that a recovery is allowed is when 
the money paid in was in the nature of a deposit and not where it was made 
as part payment. There can be no question but what the money paid in by 
the plaintiff was part payment for the merchandise. 
Bisner, 92 N.Y.S.2d at 829. 
92 Chaude v. Shepard, 122 N.Y. 397, 402 (1890). 
93 STATE OF N.Y., REPORT OF THE LAW REV. COMM'N, S. 50-65, Assemb. 87-65, at 
95–98 (1952). See also Amtorg Trading Corp. v. Miehle Prtg. Press & Mfg. Co., 206 
F.2d 103, 106 (2d Cir. 1953) (“This attempted distinction between part performance 
and a security deposit seems as impractical and unjustified as the Law Revision 
Commission states it to be.”). 
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As is typical with the common law, applicable legal principles 
trailed behind the commercial reality and so, in the evolving 
economic world, the common law was failing to deliver just results 
when problems arose with layaway plans.  Forfeiture of the 
deposit occurred even if it provided an unjust enrichment to the 
seller. 
This outcome posed a particular problem in New York State 
because New York courts were slow to recognize equitable actions 
to disgorge unjust enrichment.94  To remedy this unjust result, the 
New York State legislature had started to consider enacting a 
statute to correct the problem prior to 1942.  The attempt to amend 
the law in 1942 failed, but this effort influenced the draft of an 
amendment to the Uniform Sales Act promulgated in 1944 that 
would morph into the initial draft of the UCC, as explained 
below.95 
The drafting problem which creates the possibility of the 
additive method interpretation for § 2-718(2) and (3), allowing the 
seller to retain a penalty, results from language in the statute 
allowing the seller to retain a portion of the deposit equal to twenty 
percent or $500 of the purchase price, whichever is smaller.  No 
issue would arise had the provision simply allowed the seller to 
retain an amount equal to its actual damages, but no more. 
A proposed amendment to § 2-718 would have simplified the 
treatment of liquidated damages and deposits to do exactly that.96  
This proposed amendment was advanced in 1999 and continued in 
the failed 2003 proposed revision to Article 2, but was ultimately 
withdrawn in 201197—the provision providing for a base retention 
amount equal to the lesser of twenty percent of the purchase price 
 
94 The allowance of a suit in quasi-contract for a breaching party was uneven 
across subject matter areas, appearing prominently in famous early employment cases 
such as Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H. 481, 486–88 (1834), though not universally followed, 
even in the employment area. See Hansell v. Erickson, 28 Ill. 257, 258–59 (1862). 
Professor Patterson discussed Britton v. Turner in his report to the New York Law 
Revision Commission, noting it as the minority view and suggesting that it would not 
be the common law of New York. See REPORT OF THE LAW REVIEW COMMISSION FOR 
1942, supra note 77, at 212–19. 
95 See infra text accompanying notes 110–114. 
96 Miller, A True Story, supra note 97, at 161. 
97 The failure to amend Article 2 has generated much academic commentary. See, 
e.g., Fred H. Miller, What Can We Learn from the Failed 2003-2005 Amendments to 
UCC Article 2?, 52 S. TEX. L. REV. 471 (2011) [hereinafter Miller, What Can We Learn]. 
A brief description of proposed amendments to § 2-718 appears in Fred H. Miller’s 
Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 on Sales of Goods and the Uniform Law Process: 
A True Story of Good v.?, 11 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 143, 161–62 (2009) [hereinafter Miller, A 
True Story]. 
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and $500 was eliminated in the proposed amendment.98  This 
alteration raises a question about the origin of this provision and 
its intended purpose: where did it come from?  One might surmise 
that it had a purpose other than covering actual damages because 
covering actual damages is so easy.  To answer this conundrum, 
we must look to limitations in the common law and drafting 
history. 
The particular twenty percent formulation as used in New 
York was drafted to correct a deficiency in common law damage 
calculations, particularly the inability to recover lost profits.  A 
significant part of the rationale for allowing the seller to retain up 
to twenty percent of the purchase price without a showing of actual 
damage was the notion that such a retention would accomplish a 
form of rough justice, compensating the seller for actual losses, 
which might be difficult or impossible for the seller to prove in 
court.  Central to the set of real but unprovable damages were 
damages for lost profits; they were real in commercial reality but 
not yet real in a court of law. 
The Commission recognized that allowing return of all payments 
in excess of actual provable damages resulting from the breach 
might be inequitable to the non-defaulting seller.  In a number of 
situations involving consumer goods, such as automobiles and 
refrigerators that are price fixed by the manufacturer, the seller 
may be limited to only nominal damages, inasmuch as the 
contract and market price of the item at time of default would 
necessarily be the same.99  It is clear that the seller has suffered 
harm as a result of the default.  Either he loses profit on the 
goods, or the expense of making the sale to the defaulter or resale 
to a new buyer.  The solution in price-fixed items rests in 
changing the judicial rule for computing standardized damages, 
or in allowing the seller to retain a portion of the payment to 
indemnify him for the expenditure of time and effort necessitated 
by resale.  The New York legislature adopted the latter solution, 
permitting the seller to retain twenty percent of the contract 
price.100 
 
98 See U.C.C. § 2-718 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW. COMM’N 2003) (withdrawn 
2011). 
99 For completeness, one might add that the contract price and any resale price of 
fixed price items would be the same as well. It would be typical for the nondefaulting 
seller to resell the goods. Traditional damage theory would have allowed damages 
based on a differential between the contract price and the market price, or resale price, 
of the good that the defaulting buyer had failed to purchase. 
100 Calvin W. Corman, Restitution for Benefits Conferred by Party in Default 
Under Sales Contract, 34 TEX. L. REV. 582, 596–97 (1956). 
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By allowing a seller to retain up to twenty percent of the 
purchase price, the law allowed for the practical recovery of a form 
of damages that neither the common law nor statutory law had yet 
recognized.  The retention of the partial payments thus operated, 
albeit imperfectly, to correct for a failure of the law to theorize the 
elements of damage in a modern economy.  New York Personal 
Property Law § 145-a did not place a cap on the absolute dollar 
amount which might be retained by the seller.101  The $500 cap 
found in the UCC was a later addition.102 
Problems with proof of damages explain why, under the law 
existing at the time, it was thought necessary to draft a complex 
provision rather than a simple one that directed the seller to 
return the amount by which the deposit exceeds actual damages.  
It is perhaps unsurprising that pre-UCC law did not address the 
lost profit damages suffered by a lost volume seller.  Until the 
development of a modern economy, which produced an 
inexhaustible supply of inventory, a seller would not have suffered 
a loss if it resold a product for a price equal to or greater than the 
price agreed to be paid by the defaulting buyer.  Only with the 
development of a capitalist system that mass produced large 
volumes of inventory did the concept of lost profits emerge as a 
significant concern within the legal system.  It is these fixed price, 
mass-produced commodity-consumer goods which became the 
subject of layaway plans after World War I. 
The problem with the operation of a twenty-percent holdback 
to account for damages not provable under outdated judicial rules 
for computing damages in a simpler age is that passage of the UCC 
changed the judicial rules for computing standardized damages.  
Now, lost profit damages for a volume seller are available under 
§ 2-708(2),103 and a broad range of other incidental damages are 
available to the seller as well.104  In light of the UCC’s reform of 
the judicial rules for computing standardized damages to better 
account for seller losses in a modern economy, allowing a twenty 
percent holdback to cover damages—in addition to the additional 
damages provable following these reforms—risks a double count, 
 
101 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law, ch. 823, sec. 1, § 145-a, Laws of New York, 823 (1952). 
102 The $500 limitation appeared in the 1944 version of the Uniform Revised Sales 
Act from which the UCC’s treatment of liquidated damages and deposits was derived. 
See supra note 84. 
103 U.C.C. § 2-708(2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018). 
104 For example, both U.C.C. § 2-708(1) and U.C.C. § 2-708(2) provide that 
“incidental damages” be added to any calculation. “Incidental damages” for a seller 
are defined in U.C.C. § 2-710 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018). 
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in effect creating the premium or penalty resulting from the 
additive method.  Such a penalty is not needed under current law 
to account for actual, but unprovable, damages.  Those damages 
are now provable under separate sections of the UCC. 
Thus, it should be clear that the use of the twenty-percent 
formula in New York was not employed for the creation of a 
penalty.  Unless another rationale can be found for the inclusion 
of the twenty percent or $500 formulation in § 2-718(2) of the UCC, 
its inclusion would appear to be an error as retention of twenty 
percent is no longer needed to compensate the non-defaulting 
seller.105 
Such a rationale does exist.  The twenty percent or $500 
formulation in the pre-history of the UCC was used for an entirely 
different purpose.  It created a safe harbor exempting a small 
liquidated damages amount from a reasonableness test.106  The 
two different purposes behind the twenty percent—or twenty 
percent or $500—formulation helps to understand some of the 
confusion found in the language finally adopted. 
A. Legislative History 
In 1942, the New York Law Revision Commission 
recommended107 amending the New York Personal Property Law 
as follows: 
§ 145-a.  When buyer in default entitled to restitution. 1. Where 
the seller fails or refuses to deliver the goods, and is justified 
therein by the buyer’s repudiation or default in performance of 
the contract, but the buyer has conferred a net benefit on the 
seller by the payment of money or the transfer or delivery of 
property in part performance, and the net benefit exceeds twenty 
per cent of the value of the total performance for which the buyer 
is obligated under the contract, the buyer has a right to obtain 
restitution for the amount of such net benefit in excess of such 
 
105 In fairness, until interpretation of UCC § 2-708(2) in cases such as Neri 
confirmed a volume seller’s entitlement to lost profits, it was not clear that the UCC 
had implemented such a complete change in judicial rules for damage computation. 
Indeed, strong textual arguments can be made that Neri and its progeny are wrongly 
decided. See John M. Breen, The Lost Volume Seller and Lost Profits Under U.C.C. § 
2-708(2): A Conceptual and Linguistic Critique, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 779, 780–82, 787, 
789–90, 791–92 (1996). Nevertheless, under the conventionally accepted 
interpretation, allowing a twenty percent retention to cover lost profits results in a 
clear double count in the additive method. 
106 Id. at 798. 
107 This point was amplified in the Law Revision Commission’s 1943 report. See 
REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1943, supra note 80, at 9–10. 
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twenty per cent.  Net benefit shall be determined by deducting 
from the amount of such payment, or the value of the property 
transferred or delivered, the amount or value of the benefits, if 
any, received by the buyer or a third party beneficiary by reason 
of the contract, and the amount of the damages to which the seller 
is entitled by reason of the buyer’s default.108 
There are several things to note about this simply drafted 
proposal.  Proposed § 145-a is an additive methodology, as we saw 
in Gongora, Feinberg, and McCann.  Damages suffered by the 
seller reduce the amount of restitution owed to a defaulting 
buyer—by reducing the net benefit received by the seller—which 
is arithmetically equivalent to the simple addition of the damages 
amount to a fixed twenty percent of the purchase price.  This is 
because the proposed language contemplates that the seller retain 
twenty percent no matter what the circumstances.109  If we adopt 
the fiction that twenty percent of the purchase price represents 
actual but unprovable lost profits present in every case, then the 
addition of other provable damages to reduce “net benefits” will 
not result in double counting or overpayment.  Further, it is 
significant that the proposed amendment did not attempt to 
address, in any way, the treatment of agreements to liquidate 
damages. 
Nevertheless, New York did not enact the proposed 
amendment in 1942, and thus did not enact the “net benefit” 
formulation of the rule.  It was, however, the motivation for the 
treatment of deposits in the revision to the Uniform Sales Act.  In 
late 1941, The Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws met in Indianapolis.  This meeting generated a report and a 
second draft of The Revised Uniform Sales Act.110  That draft  
 
 
 
 
108 REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1942, supra note 77, at 185 
(1942). A note explained: “Its purpose is to modify the harshness of the existing rule 
under which the buyer loses all and at the same time afford to the seller a measure of 
reasonable protection against default by the buyer.” Id. The proposal reappeared in 
the next year's report under the section Acts and Recommendation relating to Recovery 
for Benefits Conferred by Party in Default under Contract. REPORT OF THE LAW 
REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1943, supra note 80, at 19, 23 (1943). 
109 REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1943, supra note 80, at  
23 (1943). 
110 REPORT AND SECOND DRAFT, THE REVISED UNIFORM SALES ACT (1944), 
reprinted in 1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTS (Elizabeth Slusser Kelly  
ed. 1984). 
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tackled the same problem addressed by proposed § 145-a in New 
York, but it did so using very different language.  It proposed a 
new § 64111 that provided, in relevant part, as follows: 
Section 64.  (New to Sales Act.) Liquidated Damages and 
Deposits. 
(1)(a)  The particularized terms of the contract may fix liquidated 
damages for breach by either party in any amount which is not 
unreasonable.  In estimating what is reasonable, the court may 
take into account the delay and inconvenience actually caused by 
the breach, or incident to remedy, as well as the difficulty in proof 
of damage and the convenience of administration of remedy. 
(b) A clause fixing an unreasonable amount as agreed damage is 
a penalty, and void. 
(2)(a) Any down or part payment, or “deposit”, made upon a 
contract to sell or a sale, is deemed to be made for security and 
shall in the event of breach by the buyer be limited to serving as 
security.  This subsection applies, whether or not such payment 
or deposit is agreed to be applied upon the price, and irrespective 
of any provision for its forfeiture, and whether it is in the form of 
money, check, goods, or otherwise.112 
In the comments to new Section 64, specific reference is made 
to the New York Law Revision Commission’s bill on the matter of 
sales of goods, simply stating that “[t]he better cases have refused 
to follow the view that a contract-breaker is barred from all 
remedy by the mere fact of breach.”113  Section 64 had no 
antecedents in the Uniform Sales Act of 1906, the proposed 
Federal sales act, or the first draft of the Revised Uniform Sales 
Act issued in 1940.114  The difference in the drafting approaches 
taken by New York State’s law revision commission and the 
NCCUSL, under the direction of Llewellyn, were stark. 
In proposed new Section 64, any down or part payment, or 
“deposit,” is treated as “security.”115  As security, it would be 
applied to cover actual damages and not a penalty.  A premium 
would only be possible if the contract fixed liquidated damages, 
and then only at a reasonable level.  A comment makes clear that 
whether the agreed measure of damages is reasonable within this 
section is a question for the court.116 
 
111 Id. at 557–58. 
112 Id. at 557. 
113 Id. at 558. 
114 Id. at 280 (Finder and Table of Comparable Sections). 
115 Id. at 557–58. 
116 Id. at 558. 
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This drafting approach both confronts and uses the New York 
common law distinction between a payment for the price and a 
security deposit.  By deeming all deposits—whether made for the 
price or as security—to have been made as security, the language 
would require payment of restitution for any amount by which the 
deposit exceeded damages. 
Additionally, there is no equivalent of a base retention 
amount—no twenty percent to which a non-defaulting seller is 
entitled without question or calculation.  There is no cumulative 
or additive “net benefit” formulation at all.  The explanation for 
this distinction rests with the difference in purposes behind the 
New York legislative effort and the revisions to the Uniform Sales 
Act. 
The motivation in New York was to correct a very specific 
inconsistency and not to create a more general reform of contract 
law or even damage theory.  In contrast, the revision of the 
Uniform Sales Act was designed to reform and modernize the 
entirety of sales law, including remedies.  Thus, using language in 
the revised Uniform Sales Act that treated all deposits as security 
did not risk undercompensating the nondefaulting seller.  The 
nondefaulting seller would be taken care of by the modernized 
Uniform Sales Act which would create all the damage remedies 
needed in the industrialized economy. 
Furthermore, the revised Uniform Sales Act addresses 
liquidated damages as well as deposit returns in the same section, 
an important addition, though one that introduces added 
complexity.  In the Uniform Revised Sales Act draft of 1944, we 
find § 124.  It reads, in relevant part, as follows: 
(1) Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the 
agreement but only at an amount which is reasonable in light of 
the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the 
difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or non-
feasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy.  A term 
fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a 
penalty. 
(2) A “deposit” or “down” or part payment of more than 20 per 
cent of the price or $500, whichever is smaller, made as security 
and to be forfeited on breach, is so forfeited only to the extent that 
it is a reasonable liquidation of damages . . . .117 
 
117 UNIFORM REVISED SALES ACT (Sales Chapter of Proposed Commercial Code), 
Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 75–76 (AM. LAW INST. Apr. 27, 1944) reprinted in 2 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTS (Elizabeth Slusser Kelly ed. 1984). The Uniform 
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Note that this draft appears to take a step backwards in coverage 
from the prior proposed § 64 considered in 1942.  On its face, § 124 
addresses liquidated damages only and not the more general case 
of a deposit in the absence of a liquidated damages specification.  
This drafting is not additive or cumulative because all it does is 
create a safe harbor for retention of a deposit in an amount up to 
twenty percent or $500, whichever is smaller, but only if the 
deposit was “made as security and to be forfeited on breach.”118  If 
the proposed retention of the deposit is larger than this small 
amount, then it can only be retained or not “forfeited” to the extent 
that it is “a reasonable liquidation of damages.”119  Thus, the early 
drafting attempts in the UCC history use the twenty-percent or 
$500 formulation to test a liquidated damages clause, the situation 
now addressed by § 2-718(1) and not the circumstances of 
§ 2-718(2) and (3). 
In operation, this clause exempts the retention of small dollar 
amounts from the requirement that retention of the small amount 
be a reasonable liquidation of damages evaluated by a court.  If 
the amount is small enough, it may be retained even if it is a 
penalty insofar as it allows recovery of an amount in excess of 
actual damages.  One might imagine the drafters were motivated 
by considerations of efficiency by not allowing parties to litigate 
the question of whether retention of a small amount constituted a 
“reasonable liquidation of damages.” 
When contrasted with the current version of § 2-718, the scope 
of the early formulation is much broader.  Subsection (1) of the 
current § 2-718 is the provision which addresses those agreements 
which contain a liquidated damages amount.  There, no liquidated 
amount may function as a penalty.  In theory, a court might 
examine even small amounts at risk.  Subsection (2)(b) of the 
current § 2-718 addresses a wholly different situation, in which a 
deposit is made for some unspecified reason—security, evidence of 
ability to pay, seriousness of intent to complete a transaction, and 
so forth—but the contract is silent on liquidated damages.  The 
draft of § 124 did not address this situation at all. 
 
Commercial Code project began as proposals to revise the Uniform Sales Act. See 
Robert Braucher, supra note 85, at 799–800. 
118 UNIFORM REVISED SALES ACT (Sales Chapter of Proposed Commercial Code), 
Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 76 (AM. LAW INST. Apr. 27, 1944) reprinted in 2 UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTS (Elizabeth Slusser Kelly ed. 1984). 
119 Id. 
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Section 124 remained the same in what appears to be a 
subsequent confidential version of the draft sales law prepared no 
earlier than 1945.120  By 1950, the drafts of the revised sales law 
had morphed into the UCC and started to resemble the now 
familiar structure of Article 2.  In the 1950 version, § 2-720 
addressed the liquidation or limitation of damages and deposits.121  
Even though the form and numbering of the sales law had been 
reworked, the language remained identical to that of the original 
proposed § 124.  However, the 1950 version of the Code, for the 
first time, includes a brief comment which tries to explain the 
purpose of the twenty percent or $500 formulation.122  It briefly 
states: 
Subsection (2) refuses to recognize a forfeiture unless the amount 
of the payment so forfeited represents a reasonable liquidation of 
damages as determined under subsection (1).  A special exception 
is made in the case of small amounts (20% of the price or $500, 
whichever is smaller) deposited as security.  No distinction is 
made between cases in which the payment is to be applied on the 
price and those in which it is intended as security for 
performance.  Subsection (2) is applicable to any deposit or down 
or part payment.123 
Even though the text of the proposed law seems to be limited 
in its application to a deposit that “is to be forfeited on  
breach”—that is, to a deposit for which an agreement as to 
liquidated damages has been reached—at some point, the drafters 
intended to give the clause broader applicability by having it apply 
to any deposit or down payment or part payment.124  It appears 
 
120 DRAFT UNIFORM REVISED SALES ACT reprinted in 2 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL 
CODE CONFIDENTIAL DRAFTS 88 (Kelly & Puckett eds. 1995) (noting draft was not 
prepared prior to 1945). 
121 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, TEXT AND COMMENT 
EDITION 267–68 (AM. LAW INST. & NCCUSL 1950); U.C.C. § 2-720 (Am. Law Inst. & 
NCCUSL 1950). 
122 Compare id. with DRAFT UNIFORM REVISED SALES ACT, reprinted in 2 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE CONFIDENTIAL DRAFTS 88 (Kelly & Puckett eds. 1995). 
123 U.C.C. § 2-720 cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST. & NCCUSL 1950) (emphasis added). 
124 This drafting quirk was noted by Professor Patterson in his written evaluation 
of the Uniform Commercial Code for the New York Law Revision Commission. STATE 
OF NEW YORK, 1 LAW REVISION COMMISSION REPORT, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE 705 (1955). A propensity to change the meaning of statutory 
language in a comment was commonplace. See Erwin Surrency, Research in the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 404, 408; Robert Braucher, Report on 
Article 2–Sales by Certain Members of the Faculty of the Harvard Law School, 6 BUS. 
LAW 151, 152–3 (1951); The Uniform Commercial Code: Major Differences Between 
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, 71 HARV. L. REV. 679, 686 (1958). 
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that, in 1950, the drafters of the UCC recognized that, when the 
drafting moved from § 64 to § 124 in the revised Uniform Sales 
Act, protection for some deposits had been inadvertently lost in 
translation.  Despite the limiting language, the idea all along was 
to protect all deposits by treating them as made for security. 
The 1957 version gave express operative effect to the idea that 
the section should apply to any deposit in § 2-718, which governs 
liquidation or limitation of damages and deposits.125  The 
numbering and form of the section remained the same in the 1958 
version, including the comment which originally appeared in 1950, 
albeit a comment describing a differently drafted section.126  No 
change was made in the 1962 version to § 2-718 or the relevant 
comment.127  Section 2-718 remains today the same as it appeared 
in 1962.128 
Some “post” legislative history from the withdrawn attempt to 
amend Article 2 provides some idea of how the drafting 
institutions viewed § 2-718.129  A Reporter’s Note to revised Article 
2 in 1999 characterized current subsection (b) as a “statutory 
liquidated damages” clause: 
[Reporter’ s Note – Subsection (b) also drops the statutory 
liquidated damages clause that operates in the absence of an 
express liquidated damages provision.  In the current law, this 
provides that “in the absence of such terms, twenty per cent of 
the value of the total performance for which the buyer is obligated 
under the contract or $500, whichever is smaller.”]130 
 
125 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 1957 OFFICIAL EDITION, 62–63 (Am. Law Inst. 
& Unif. Law Comm’n 1957). 
126 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 1958 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS, 212–13 
(Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 1958). 
127 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 1962 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS, 213–15 
(Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 1962). 
128 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED, MASTER EDITION, VOLUME 1C, UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE, 642–43 (2012). 
129 Use of failed revised Article 2 as a resource to interpret the existing Article 2 
is endorsed in the literature. See David Frisch, Amended U.C.C Article 2 as Code 
Commentary, 11 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 175, 177 (2009); accord Hawkland at § 2-718:3 (noting 
that “[i]n 2011, the [ULC and ALI] withdrew . . . the amendments to Article 
2 . . . . These proposed amendments may help inform interpretation and application 
of current law”). The retrospective does provide insights here, despite the 
metaphysical oddity of explaining a prior event by reference to a later event. It might 
be justified by observing that the later comments nevertheless took place within the 
same interpretive community—namely, the ALI and the ULC. It does shed light on 
how these two institutions viewed their own prior work product. 
130 See DISCUSSION DRAFT, REVISION OF UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 
2—SALES, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 112 
(Dec. 1999). 
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Characterization of § 2-718(b) as a “statutory liquidated damages 
clause” is significant.  A liquidated damages clause operates in lieu 
of a traditional damages calculation—not in addition to it. 
Once a liquidated damage clause has been shown to be part of 
the agreement, it represents the exclusive remedy available to 
the aggrieved party, who may not seek other damages or other 
legal remedies.  This was the well settled rule at common law and 
is almost certainly the rule under section 2-718.131 
The characterization of § 2-718(2)(b) as a statutory liquidated 
damages clause for those who did not draft one does not support 
the additive method.  Rather, it supports the alternative approach 
of Neri and the context sensitive method recommended here. 
In the 2003 version of the Amendments to § 2-718(3), the 
commentary was changed to read: “The statutory 
liquidated-damages deduction from the breaching buyer’s 
restitution remedy has also been eliminated.”132  This comment 
was in line with viewing the twenty percent or $500 formulation 
as a form of statutory liquidated damages, though it does not 
explicitly state that the provision was intended to function in place 
of an express liquidated damages clause. 
B. How Should This Legislative History Be Evaluated? 
Notably, the drafting process of the UCC involved two distinct 
and influential groups, amongst others: “Downtown” or Wall 
Street business lawyers in New York City, who either participated 
in, or were familiar with, the New York Law Revision Commission 
process to fix the asymmetry between treatment of defaulting 
sellers and defaulting buyers; and “uptown,” or academic lawyers, 
primarily at Columbia Law School, led by Karl Llewellyn, who 
undertook efforts to revise the Uniform Sales Act, which morphed  
 
 
 
 
 
 
131 Roy Ryden Anderson, Liquidated Damages under the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 41 SW. L.J. 1083, 1104 (1987). 
132 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
APPENDIX-ARTICLE 2. SALES (Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 2003) (Amendments 
Proposed in 2003 and Withdrawn from the Official Text in 2011). 
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into the UCC.133  Section 2-718 is a product of drafting efforts and 
compromise between these two different groups with overlapping 
but still distinct concerns and experiences. 
A review of the drafting process indicates that none of the 
antecedents to current § 2-718(2) and (3) were aimed at providing 
a penalty or a premium to a non-defaulting seller.  At most, in New 
York, the retention of twenty percent was designed to strike a fair 
balance by allowing the nondefaulting seller to retain something 
for his troubles.134 
Under the enacted amendment to New York Personal 
Property Law § 145-a, the retention of a deposit equal to twenty 
percent of the purchase price might inadvertently result in 
overcompensation to a nondefaulting seller; however, this outcome 
was not its aim.135  Section 145-a, like its “net benefits” precursor 
in 1942, simply included the twenty percent retention rate as a 
quick fix to correct a common law deficiency with the calculation 
of damages.  The downtown lawyers used the base retention 
amount idea to avoid undercompensation for nondefaulting 
sellers.  They opted for a quick fix because reforming the law of 
damages was not their charge.  Instead, their narrow task was to 
provide restitution to defaulting buyers. 
As for the revised Uniform Sales Act process, initially the 
uptown lawyers wanted a modern law, so when they became aware 
of the problems associated with restitution of deposits with which 
New York was struggling, they wanted to counter the archaic 
common law distinction between a part payment and a security 
deposit.136  However, they were not worried about shortcomings in 
the common law theory of damage recovery because, as part of  
 
 
133 See Allen R. Kamp, Downtown Code: A History of the Uniform Commercial 
Code 1949-1954, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 359 (2001); Allen R. Kamp, Uptown Act: A History 
of the Uniform Commercial Code: 1940-49, 51 S.M.U. L. REV. 275 (1998). For a general 
overview of the drafting process, see William A. Schnader, A Short History of the 
Preparation and Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L.  
REV. 1 (1967). 
134 See REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1943, supra note 80, at 
19–23; accord 1 LAW REVISION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 124, at 704 
(describing New York’s twenty-percent retention as compensation for risk, incidental 
expenses, the burden of making a deal, and being ready to perform). Significantly, in 
comparing the proposed UCC and New York law, Professor Patterson noted that in 
New York, a seller was not required to prove the elements of damage—which, after 
all, was the very point of the twenty percent formulation. Id. at 704–05. 
135 Id. at 704–05. 
136 Kamp, supra note 133, at 371. 
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their process, they were drafting the damages rules that would 
govern.137  No base retention amount was needed as a quick fix for 
the uptown lawyers. 
Another consideration was at play here; the uptown lawyers 
were not very interested in problems associated with restitution of 
deposits.  They did not identify the problem—it was not their 
“baby”—but they were prepared to address it.  Karl Llewellyn and 
the other uptown lawyers were very interested in problems of 
unconscionability, reasonableness, good faith, and the like,138 and 
they were interested in the treatment of liquidated damages 
clauses because of the interplay with these concepts.  They were 
interested in questions such as the following: when should a court 
refuse to enforce a liquidated damages clause for being 
unreasonable or for being unconscionable?  Should a court test for 
reasonableness only at the execution of the contract or again, later, 
at the time of default?  Is proposing a penalty related to bad faith?  
The questions were interesting.139  Additionally, interwoven into 
the mix were considerations about judicial economy.140  After all, a 
liquidated damages clause is used to avoid a damages 
calculation—and thus eliminate the need for judicial time—but 
little or nothing is saved if consideration of a damages calculation 
is simply replaced by consideration of whether the liquidated 
 
137 Id. at 372. 
138 See, e.g., Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 27 STAN L. REV. 621, 627–30 (1975) (discussing the UCC’s use of 
concepts such as commercial reasonableness, good faith, and unconscionability); 
Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 
U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967); Imad D. Abyad, Note, Commercial Resonableness in Karl 
Llewellyn’s Uniform Commercial Code Jurisprudence, 83 VA. L. REV. 429 (1997). See 
generally WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 291,  
360 (2d ed. 2012). 
139 Retesting a liquidated damages amount after the time of contract formation 
caused a great deal of consternation. See STATE OF NEW YORK, 1 LAW REVISION 
COMMISSION REPORT, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 580–82,  
704 (1955). 
140 Llewellyn favored rules and practices that had a positive effect of saving costs, 
such as by providing clarity and avoiding litigation, and he recognized the role of a 
cost-benefit form of analysis. See Karl Llewellyn, What Price Contract? An Essay in 
Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 724 n.45 (1931) (raising the idea that sometimes the 
speed of judicial administration outweighs the chance of injustice to the litigants). He 
was interested in standardized contracts because “[t]hey materially ease and cheapen 
selling and distribution.” Id. at 731. Llewellyn criticized opponents of the UCC by 
stating: “[they] do not seem to understand a balance sheet.” Karl N. Llewellyn, 
Statement to the Law Revision Commission, A Simple Case on Behalf of the Code, 
NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMM’N, RECORD OF HEARINGS ON THE UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE 27 (1954) reprinted in TWINING, supra note 138, at 586, 597. 
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damages amount should be enforced.  The purpose of the formula, 
in the hands of the uptown lawyers, was to relieve a court from 
having to test small amounts for reasonableness, or so it seems.141  
To the extent one can look to the “deep background” motives of 
Karl Llewellyn and the other uptown lawyers, this was not a case 
in which the UCC was attempting to overturn the general contract 
law presumption against premiums or penalties. 
The difference in focus and in the tasks appointed for the 
uptown lawyers and the downtown lawyers explains why, when 
the revised Uniform Sales Act progressed from § 64 to § 124, the 
twenty percent or $500 formulation remained but was used for the 
entirely different purpose of creating a liquidated damages safe 
harbor.  Literally, in this transition, protection for an ordinary 
deposit was dropped entirely.  What is completely clear, again, is 
that initial use of the twenty percent or $500 formula by the 
uptown lawyers was not aimed at providing for a penalty or a 
premium. 
Rather, the formula was used to render enforceable—without 
a reasonableness test—a prior agreement on payment of an 
amount that might result in a penalty but only as a byproduct of 
foregoing the reasonableness test.  When the uptown lawyers 
previously focused on problems specific to restitution of deposits 
in § 64, no formula was used; instead, all deposits were treated as 
having been made as “security.”142 
The drafting complexity arose when the uptown lawyers 
introduced the formula for one purpose, and then repositioned it 
for another purpose later in the drafting process.  In the final 
drafting of the UCC, the twenty percent or $500 formulation 
ceased to be a safe harbor to protect express liquidated damages 
clauses.  Rather, it morphed into a statutory liquidated damages 
clause, covering small amounts, for those parties who had not 
agreed to liquidated damages.143  However, this statutory 
liquidated damages clause had an odd “heads I win, tails you lose” 
quality.  A nondefaulting seller could accept the statutory 
liquidated damages amount when convenient; however, unlike a 
traditional liquidated damages clause, the nondefaulting seller 
 
141 No comment was included on § 124 to the Uniform Revised Sales Act when it 
was first introduced. See DRAFT UNIFORM REVISED SALES ACT, reprinted in 2 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE CONFIDENTIAL DRAFTS 88 (Kelly & Puckett eds. 1995). 
142 See supra text accompanying note 115. 
143 This is why the later annotations and comments to the UCC refer to subsection 
(2)(b) as statutory liquidated damages. 
402 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:365   
was not bound by, or limited to, collection of that amount if greater 
damages might be proved.  This structure was needed when the 
$500 cap was introduced.  Had the statutory liquidated damages 
amount simply been set at twenty percent, one might have 
attempted to limit nondefaulting sellers to that amount.144 
This analysis shows that there is no historical basis to 
interpret UCC § 2-718(2) and (3) as a case in which the drafters of 
the UCC made an exception to allow for a penalty or a premium.145  
Accordingly, UCC § 1-305 should not be used to justify application 
of the additive method for interpretation of § 2-718(2) and (3).  
Moreover, the legislative history review discloses nothing to 
challenge the conclusion that courts should apply the context 
sensitive method advanced in Part III.146  Indeed, the narrative 
strengthens the conviction that the context sensitive method of 
computation is correct. 
To summarize the results so far, Gongora, Feinberg, and 
McCann were wrongly decided and are not simply cases of courts 
ignoring the binding precedent of Neri.  Neri was correctly decided 
on the substantive outcome, but wrong in the details of its 
statutory construction—perhaps a case of no harm, no foul.  UCC 
§ 2-718(2) and (3) should be applied, to the extent possible, to 
provide for actual damage recovery and no more.  In cases where 
the nondefaulting seller’s damages are less than the base retention 
amount, the odd statutory liquidated damages clause must be 
given effect in deference to the statutory language and to 
legislative history suggesting the intent to create a statutory 
liquidated damages clause.  Homage to the statutory language 
means that some nondefaulting sellers will be overcompensated in 
small amounts, but that seems to be the point of the language 
because the statute strikes a balance, tolerating a modest bit of 
unjust enrichment in exchange for judicial economy in small cases. 
 
144 Such an effort at substantive regulation might well have failed, however. 
While the original UCC drafting process contemplated a fair amount of substantive 
regulation, over time substantive regulation was replaced with an emphasis on 
default rules to be used in the absence of agreement. 
145 See U.C.C. § 1-305(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018) (“The 
remedies provided by [the Uniform Commercial Code] must be liberally administered 
to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other 
party had fully performed but neither consequential or special damages nor penal 
damages may be had except as specifically provided in [the Uniform Commercial 
Code] or by other rule of law.”). 
146 See supra notes 57–71 and accompanying text. 
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V. THE MULTIPLYING EFFECTS OF A “SMALL  
CALCULATION QUIBBLE” 
The “penalty” interpretation of § 2-718(2) and (3) has the 
potential for causing widespread difficulties in the populace.  The 
problem cries out for a correction for four reasons. 
A. Summary of Reasons to Care About the Problem 
First, proposed changes to the UCC that would have fixed the 
problem were withdrawn by the ALI and the ULC.  This problem 
has had a solution since at least 1999.147  Stewardship of the law 
requires follow-through to insure the law produces a just result, 
particularly for those of modest means, once a case of injustice is 
identified. 
Second, the penalty interpretation of UCC § 2-718(2) and 
(3) serves no countervailing purpose, particularly in light of the 
interpretation’s potential to adversely impact large numbers of 
persons.  Imposing a penalty in the absence of any justification 
whatsoever is unreasonable.  Some might argue a cautious 
interpretation of a provision such as § 2-718 because it does, in 
some cases, result in an overcompensation mandated by statute 
without even the fig leaf of the agreement of the parties on a 
liquidated amount.  Llewellyn captured this idea best when he 
said, “where the reason stops there stops the rule.”148  Indeed, 
economic theory disfavors enforcement of penalties because 
penalties discourage efficient breaches in which social utility is 
increased.149  To be sure, one might keep the twenty percent or 
$500 formulation for the purpose of judicial economy—resulting in 
a small amount of overcompensation—to discourage litigation over 
small amounts, but there is no justification when damages exceed 
the base retention amount.  Stewardship of the law requires 
prudence to err on the side of caution. 
Third, the penalty interpretation may cause actual harm by 
creating a prevailing sense that the legal system produces unfair 
results, particularly among the large percentage of the population 
who face economic hardships.  Misapplication of the law 
contributes in a case like this, at least in a small way, to a 
 
147 A draft amendment to Article 2 was first approved in 1999. 
148 See TWINING, supra note 138, at 210. 
149 See, e.g., Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1289 (1985) 
(Posner, J.). An efficient breach creates a Pareto optimal outcome. See Larry A. 
Dimatteo, A Theory of Efficient Penalty: Eliminating the Law of Liquidated Damages, 
38 AM. BUS. L.J. 633, 636–37 (2001). 
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breakdown in respect for the rule of law.  This issue is a problem 
for a statute like the UCC, which is drafted to rely on open-ended 
and general standards, such as good faith, reasonableness, and 
unconscionability.  The structure of the UCC already requires 
courts to engage in ad hoc reasoning, which is difficult to fit within 
general rules.150  When general standards of a law are applied in 
such a way that it results in an unjust outcome, confidence in the 
law is jeopardized.  Individuals have no reason to trust the 
application of general principles when the law gets the details so 
very wrong.  Stewardship of the law requires taking steps to 
strengthen respect for the rule of law, not senselessly sowing 
random seeds of discontent.151 
Fourth, the law has an expressive function by reflecting a 
society’s values.152  In these economic times, with problems of 
growing income inequality, the law should not express the 
retrograde idea that a nondefaulting seller is allowed to retain 
premiums or penalties out of a defaulting buyer’s deposits, 
particularly without any countervailing reason justifying a 
penalty; naked unjust enrichment will not suffice as a rationale.  
Concern over the expressive message of the law is always 
paramount.  Stewardship of the law requires ensuring that the law 
conveys a message that appeals to the good of society. 
B. Evaluation of Social Science Data Supporting the Need for a 
Change and the Difficulties Assessing the Scope of the 
Problem 
Studies show that many Americans live paycheck to 
paycheck153 and would have trouble making an unexpected $500 
payment—the very amount of the maximum computation error at 
 
150 Employing words like “reasonable” in a statute invites ad hoc reasoning. “The 
word reasonable, effective in small doses, has been administered by the bucket, 
leaving the corpus of the Code reeling in dizzy confusion.” David Mellinkoff, The 
Language of the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 Yale L.J. 185, 185–86 (1967). See 
generally ROBERTO UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 197 (1976) (discussing problems 
with general rules). 
151 Cf. ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 84 (1975) (“[T]o be 
effective as a means of order, the laws must deserve and win the allegiance of the 
citizenry.”). 
152 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. 
L. REV. 2021 (1996). 
153 Quentin Fottrell, Half of US Working Families Are Living Paycheck to 
Paycheck, N.Y. POST (Apr. 5, 2017, 2:46 P.M), http://nypost.com/2017/04/05/half-of-us-
working-families-are-living-paycheck-to-paycheck/. 
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issue in these cases.154  A study published in 2015 found that 
twenty-five percent of families had less than $400 in savings.155  
More broadly, in 2017, forty percent of adults report that they or 
their families had trouble meeting at least one basic need for food, 
health care, housing, or utilities.156  Similarly, over twenty percent 
of Americans report they have no retirement savings.157 
Therefore, what some might minimize as a small calculation 
quibble is actually not a small amount for a significant portion of 
the population.  While there is a lack of case law regarding this 
issue, the absence of court decisions could very well be reflective 
of the high transaction costs that keep most cases from being 
litigated.  When the policy cannot be supported by data, those 
associated with law reform should consider avoidance of corrosive 
impacts as a matter of reasonable system design.  People lose 
respect for a legal system that produces results that treat them 
unfairly. 
Some might argue that this data, standing alone, do not show 
a problem widespread enough to merit attention.  The response is 
complex and requires an appeal to structural observations about 
how the legal system itself can mask the importance of underlying 
social problems. 
It is unrealistic to assume that the legal system itself, through 
a simple count of publicly available decisions, reveals the full 
extent of injustices occurring in the real world.  Examination of 
case law serves as an imperfect window into matters of societal 
concern.  Given the small amounts at stake in any individual case, 
scant lawyer or judicial time will be spent analyzing and correcting 
for an easy and straightforward—though wrong—application of 
the statute. 
Transaction costs alone explain why individual cases in this 
area receive little attention.  Significantly, the UCC does not 
provide for recovery of attorney fees or penalty judgments to 
induce private attorneys to function in the public interest in lieu 
 
154 McGrath, supra note 3. 
155 THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 4, at 6 (“The typical household has 
$3,800 in liquid savings, but a quarter of households have more than $17,000, and 
another quarter has less than $400.”). 
156 MICHAEL KARPMAN ET AL., supra note 5. 
157 1 in 3 Americans Have Less Than $5,000 in Retirement Savings, THE 
NORTHWESTERN MUTUAL LIFE INS. COMPANY (May 8, 2018), https://news.north 
westernmutual.com/2018-05-08-1-In-3-Americans-Have-Less-Than-5-000-In-
Retirement-Savings. 
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of a state actor.158  Moreover, the UCC does not contain class action 
provisions, which might operate to aggregate small individual 
claims into a single matter of sufficient size to attract the attention 
of private attorneys.159  Even if the UCC contained class action 
provisions, individualized consideration of transaction damages 
would not satisfy traditional requirements for class certification in 
deposit return cases. 
Further, many cases in which this problem is addressed may 
never become decisions that are available and easily accessed 
through Lexis or Westlaw.  Many consumers victimized by an 
excessive retention of a deposit probably never bring a lawsuit.  
Even if a lawsuit is brought, the case may settle.  If the case goes 
to judgment, that judgment may not result in a written order of 
decision published in an electronic database.  The publicly 
available decisions merely suggest a deeper problem that 
traditional social science data fails to identify directly.  
Nevertheless, this argument has a foundational basis: (1) a large 
segment of the population may be adversely impacted by an 
incorrect application of the law; (2) those affected will include 
low-income individuals, without access to credit, for whom a $500 
loss is significant; and (3) retaining a penalty creates an unjust 
enrichment.  The best course in such a case is for the steward of 
law to err on the side of caution and make the correction. 
C. The Problem of Design Failures 
Recognition that the structure of the UCC itself, and the 
process for its amendment, jointly operate to disadvantage lower 
income groups, among others, creates a call for action.  The power 
structure created the problem with the drafting of the law, and the 
power structure has an amendment process ill-suited to clean up 
after its mistakes.  The reality runs counter to the conventional, 
and often incorrect, view of statutes.  On the conventional view, a 
court aims to implement legislative will when interpreting a 
 
158 See Caroline Edwards, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code and 
Consumer Protection: The Refusal to Experiment, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 663, 668,  
717–18 (2004). Indeed, the expense of filing a small claims case itself might function 
as a deterrent to bringing suit in the first instance. In Miami-Dade County, Florida, 
for example, the filing fee is a sliding scale that can be as much as $300. Additional 
fees are required for issuance of a summons and service of process by a sheriff. See 
Small Claims Court – How to File a Claim, HARVEY RUVIN CLERK OF THE COURTS, 
MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, http://www.miami-dadeclerk.com/property_small_ 
claims.asp (last visited July 31, 2019). 
159 Edwards, supra note 158, at 720. 
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statute, and when a court produces an incorrect result, it can 
easily be remedied by statutory amendment.160  The problem 
arises when a non-majoritarian decision of consequence is not 
merely transitory.  Stewardship of the law requires correction of 
these design failures. 
1. Design Failure Number 1: UCC Operating Like a Civil  
Law System 
Examining the case law, particularly the disconnect between 
Neri and the later New York State cases, leads to conjecture about 
how this area of law operates.  The theory is that, at least in an 
area of the law constrained by transaction costs, our legal system, 
and particularly statutes like the UCC, operates much more like a 
traditional civil law system than like a common law system.161  The 
UCC, though a statute, was not designed to work like a traditional 
civil code.162  A traditional civil law system is a system in which 
the mode of analysis relies on the reading of a code or a statute, 
largely in isolation, divorced from the consideration of precedents 
and, perhaps, other secondary materials.163  In such a system, a 
premium is placed on clear drafting and straightforward 
application of statutory language, which § 2-718 lacks.164 
An ambiguity differs from an open or general term.  The claim 
is not made here that the drafters of the UCC intentionally created 
ambiguities, like that found in § 2-718.165  The drafters did, 
however, intentionally use open and general terms which 
 
160 See Harry H. Wellington, The Nature of Judicial Review, 91 YALE. L.J. 486, 
487 (1982) (noting the conventional view and its shortcomings). 
161 Weiss, supra note 9. 
162 It is generally accepted that the UCC is not designed to be a classical civil law 
code. See John E. Murray, Jr., Revised Article 2: Eliminating the “Battle” and 
Unconscionability, 52 S. TEX. L.R. 593, 594 (2011). It is sometimes called a “common 
law code” because it allows and depends on case law development. Id. See also 
Caroline N. Brown, Restoring Peace in the Battle of the Forms: A Framework for 
Making Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-207 Work, 69 N.C. L. REV. 893 (1991) 
(“The drafters envisioned Article 2 as a fabric of statutory law that takes its essential 
character from its framework of common law and commercial reality”); Lewis A. 
Grossman, Langdell Upside-Down: James Coolidge Carter and the Anticlassical 
Jurisprudence of Anticodification, 19 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 149, 215–16 (2007). 
163 Weiss, supra note 9. 
164 A literal reading of Article 2 often is not possible; rather, one comes to 
understand Article 2’s meaning only after appreciation of its purposes. See generally 
Eugene F. Mooney, Old Kontract Principles and Karl's New Kode: An Essay on the 
Jurisprudence of Our New Commercial Law, 11 VILL. L. REV. 213, 219–21 (1966). 
165 The most famous UCC drafting ambiguity appears in § 2-207, which addresses 
the “battle of the forms.” This ambiguity also was addressed in revised Article 2. See 
Murray, supra note 162, at 601. 
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anticipated later court involvement in the ongoing development of 
commercial law.166  Indeed, the UCC depends upon case law 
development to flesh out open terms like “reasonable” and 
“unconscionable” to fill gaps and adapt to changing commercial 
practices.167 
The UCC’s system design depends on significant ex post 
examination.  Llewellyn was explicit about the need for court 
involvement: 
Technical language and complex statement cannot be wholly 
avoided.  But they can be reduced to a minimum.  The essential 
presupposition of so reducing them is faith in the courts to give 
reasonable effect to reasonable intention of the language. 
Semi-permanent Acts must envisage and must encourage 
development by the courts.168 
This set-up created the environment in which a lower value 
was placed on language precision because any ambiguities would 
be addressed as a byproduct of the expected court involvement in 
applying open and general terms.  Moreover, another UCC design 
feature devalued statutory drafting precision.  By agreement, 
parties may vary most UCC provisions.169  Recognition of 
contractual freedom allows parties to simply contract around 
drafting problems in the statutory language.  In contrast, a civil 
code places a greater premium on drafting precision both because 
its terms are not applied against a backdrop of precedent and 
because more of its provisions are mandatory.170 
In the realm of the low dollar case, however, the text of the 
statute assumes a primacy not present in larger cases.  If the 
parties and the court do not have the resources to consult the case 
law or to reflect on the intricacies of the drafting, the system 
envisioned for the proper functioning of the UCC breaks down.  If  
 
 
 
166 The drafters trusted courts to sensibly apply general terms to specific 
circumstances. Miller, A True Story, supra note 97, at 144 n.6 (2009). 
167 See Miller, What Can We Learn, supra note 97, at 471–72. 
168  Memorandum from Karl N. Llewellyn to the Executive Committee on Scope 
and Program, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Re: 
Possible Uniform Commercial Code, reprinted in TWINING, supra note 138, at 580, 582 
(emphasis in original). 
169 UCC § 1-302(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018). 
170 Weiss, supra note 9. In contrast, the drafting of Article 2 often is criticized. 
See, e.g., William H. Henning, Amended Article 2: What Went Wrong?, 11 DUQ. BUS. 
L.J. 131 (2009) (describing the drafting of original Article 2 as “confusing and  
even sloppy”). 
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this conjecture is correct, it provides support for a statutory 
amendment as the solution, as this Article argues, rather than 
other corrective action. 
The conjecture is motivated by the anecdotal observation of 
the case law examined above.  Even though Neri is one of the most 
famous contract cases in the United States, it was not considered 
by the court in Feinberg.  Though Gongora did cite to Feinberg, the 
court did not mention the Neri case, despite its notoriety and even 
though it would appear to be binding precedent.  McCann did not 
cite to Neri, Feinberg, or Gongora.  Nor, for that matter, did 
Santos. 
Even the cases that use the alternative approach are short on 
use of authority.  The Neri court failed to note its own prior dicta 
in Proctor & Gamble Distributing Corp. that would have supported 
a decision to reject the additive method to compute a final 
restitution amount.  Honsberg did not cite to any authority; 
neither did Madsen v. Murrey & Sons Co., Inc., nor did Bowen v. 
Gardner.  To be sure, Anheuser considered Neri, and Conister 
considered both Murrey and Anheuser, illustrating that all is not 
lost. 
In such a milieu, one should worry whether parties will 
consult official comments to the UCC, the drafting history of a code 
section, a Permanent Editorial Board comment, or other secondary 
sources.  None of the cases, whether additive method or alternative 
approach, even recognize the possible drafting ambiguity inherent 
in § 2-718(2) and (3).  Most courts simply perform a calculation 
without explaining the relationship of the statute to that 
calculation.  Later cases, which might have picked up on the 
ambiguity in § 2-718 noted by Professor Pettit,171 predictably fail 
to cite to secondary authority. 
Moreover, the secondary literature that might help, if 
consulted, is in disarray.  Though one can put the Hawkland 
treatise to good use as discussed in Part III, its analysis is 
incomplete because it does not discuss the interpretive options 
identified by Professor Pettit in 2000, nor does it cite to Neri.  An 
early law review article applied the additive method without 
considering alternatives.172  The Anderson treatise is hopelessly 
brief, managing an inconsistency nonetheless.173  In one section, 
 
171 See Pettit, supra note 39, at 1496–97. 
172 Robert J. Nordstrom, Restitution on Default and Article Two of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 19 VAND. L. REV. 1143, 1172–73 (1966). 
173 4A Part II ANDERSON U.C.C. § 2-718:45 (3d ed.) (2017). 
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Anderson cites to both Honsberg and Feinberg without noting the 
different calculation methods used.174  Moreover, it too misses 
Neri.  Further, in another section, Anderson cites to a number of 
alternative approach cases, without addressing the additive 
method of Feinberg,175 missing Neri a second time, while 
nevertheless citing to Proctor & Gamble.176  The Quinn’s treatise 
fails to notice the difference between the additive method and the 
alternative approach while citing to only two cases, Feinberg and 
Anheuser v. Oswald Refractories Co., Inc.177  To the extent a court 
or a litigant bothered to look, the secondary literature would not 
help with the core analytical issue.  At worst, consulting the 
secondary literature might lead to the use of the additive method. 
2. Design Failure Number 2: The Cumbersome Amendment 
Process 
A system which requires two institutions, the ALI and the 
ULC, to gear up the machinery of change and then engage fifty 
state legislatures, is designed to address broad reform.178  
Technical fixes tag along for the ride on those rare occasions when 
this engine is started.  One reason the UCC was drafted using 
general terms that invite court development is the recognition that 
the formal and cumbersome amendment process is unlikely to 
respond rapidly to changing circumstances, new developments, 
and the like. 
Llewellyn had the notion, starting with the proposed Federal 
Sales Act, of a “grand codificatory act”: 
A codificatory Act covering a large body of private law must not 
be treated as ordinary legislation.  It is not ordinary legislation.  
It is not legislation capable of easy or frequent amendment; 
errors in it, if any, are rather to be suffered than amended, over  
 
 
 
 
 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at § 2-718:48. 
176 Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co. v. Lawrence Am. Field Warehousing Corp., 16 
N.Y.2d 344, 354–55, 266 N.Y.S.2d 785, 792–93 (1965). 
177 2 QUINN'S UCC COMMENTARY & LAW DIGEST § 2-718[A][10] (Rev. 2d  
ed.) (2018). 
178 For a description of the coordination between the ALI and the ULC on a project 
like the revision to Article 2, see Peter A. Alces & Chris Byrne, Is it Time for the 
Restatement of Contracts, Fourth?, 11 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 195–96 (2009). 
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very considerable periods.  Such a codificatory Act is in a peculiar 
sense permanent legislation; it enters into the commercial 
structure of the country.179 
In Llewellyn’s vision, a grand codificatory act relied essentially on 
development and explication by courts, using a common law 
methodology. 
If ever there was legislation which is declaratory of principle, 
which is in essence and intent the laying down of rules to be 
developed by the courts as common law rules are themselves 
developed by the courts, and molded to the succession of 
unforeseen circumstances, this proposed Bill is such 
legislation.180 
When the revision of sales law moved from a focus on a federal 
sales act to state law, Llewellyn continued to view the state law as 
the same sort of grand codificatory act that amounted to 
semi-permanent legislation.181 
The abandonment of the federal sales act process, however, 
compounded the problem.  No longer would a single federal law be 
able to set the tone for uniformity among the several states.  
Passage of a grand codificatory act now required parallel action in 
all the states.  The United States Supreme Court case of Erie v. 
Tompkins made the uniformity problem even more acute.182  
Following Erie, the federal courts no longer would be able to set an 
example in diversity cases by declaring a federal common law of 
sales.183 
This design feature, relying on the twin pillars of generality 
and a common law-like stewardship by judges, can be a systemic 
strength given the nature of the amendment process.  It 
transforms into a weakness when transaction costs deter parties 
and courts from engaging with legal developments external to the 
text of the statute itself.  The grand codificatory act simply does 
not work when courts and parties do not consult the 
 
179 K. N. Llewellyn, The Needed Federal Sales Act, 26 VA. L. REV. 558, 561 (1940) 
(emphasis in original) (describing the proposed federal sales act as a codificatory act); 
accord Miller, What Can We Learn, supra note 97, at 472 (noting that the design of 
the UCC mitigates the need for frequent amendments). 
180 Llewellyn, supra note 179, at 561–62 (emphasis in original). 
181 Memorandum from Karl N. Llewellyn to the Executive Committee on Scope 
and Program, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Re: 
Possible Uniform Commercial Code, reprinted in TWINING, supra note 138, at 582–83 
(describing state uniform sales law as semi-permanent legislation). 
182 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
183 See Hiram Thomas, The Federal Sales Bill as Viewed by the Merchant and the 
Practitioner, 26 VA. L. REV. 537, 539 (1940). 
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supplementary material generated by the system.  Changes in law 
need to appear in the text of the statute to influence decisions in 
small cases.  The amendment process needs to provide for small 
and technical changes which may nevertheless have a significant 
impact.  The statutory amendment process, at least to date, does 
not feature this adaptiveness. 
The amendment process for the UCC, however, has tended to 
think big, with changes focused on comprehensive amendments to 
entire articles or the inclusion of a new article altogether.  
Familiar examples include the conceptual rethinking of Article 8, 
which led to a significant rewrite of the law governing investment 
securities, the addition of Article 2A to cover leases, and the failed 
attempt at a large scale amendment to Article 2 governing sales.  
The process of drafting a model act includes—and indeed may 
properly prioritize—the normative function of stating what the 
law should be.  Disagreement over the normative directions of the 
law doomed revised Article 2.184  Revised Article 2 was too big to 
succeed.  And yet, very few sections of the proposed revisions 
attracted serious opposition.185  A new, scaled back revision to 
Article 2 led by the ALI and the ULC, however, does not seem to 
be in our immediate future. 
The failure of the Article 2 revision process likely has a fairly 
traditional explanation found in political science literature.  In the 
legislative process, interest groups exert pressure on legislators 
who are concerned with reelection.  Political processes 
systematically undervalue large diffuse group preferences and 
overvalue small cohesive group preferences.  Thus, a focused 
business group has an advantage over scattered interests, such as 
consumers.186  Groups like the ALI and the ULC likely were not 
captured by business interests in this case, at least not on the large 
number of beneficial amendments, which provoked no controversy.  
Desired model legislation was produced on many points.  However, 
a traditional capture story, coupled with indifference to a whittled 
 
184 Henry Deeb Gabriel, The 2003 Amendments of Article Two of the Uniform 
Commercial Code: Eight Years or a Lifetime After Completion, 52 S. TEX. L. REV. 487, 
494, 495 (2011) (identifying opposition to the treatment of deferred terms and scope 
as the core problems). 
185 Id. at 494. 
186 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND 
THE THEORY OF GROUPS 128 (1965); see also RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 
38–49 (1982); TODD SANDLER, COLLECTIVE ACTION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS  
63–94 (1992). 
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down project, played out in the various state legislatures.187  Many 
beneficial technical amendments were not enacted for the simple 
reason that they were contained in a much larger amendment.  
Interest groups objected to some aspects of the large amendment, 
but not to the technical improvements. 
Given the focus of the ALI and the ULC on large, sweeping 
projects, concerns affecting ordinary people were lost as collateral 
damage when lobbyists successfully opposed the large amendment 
to Article 2, which contained the needed technical fix.  Perhaps a 
failure to appreciate the potential impact of a $500 loss prevented 
the elites from realizing what was lost when the amendment 
process failed.  This failure was not simply a lost opportunity to 
address concerns over the treatment of deferred terms or 
information and computer programs;188 it was a lost opportunity 
to make the statute more just in its operation for ordinary people. 
This example reveals that the design failure of the grand 
amendment process comes with serious costs imposed when a 
grand project fails.  All the beneficial yet not controversial changes 
are lost.  The impact of these costs is cushioned when courts and 
parties fall back upon case law decisions to resolve uncertainties 
associated with the statutory text.  This safety net fails, however, 
when transaction costs cause parties and courts to use the UCC 
like a civil code, ignoring precedent and other supplemental 
sources. 
To be sure, minor adjustments sometimes appear in 
pronouncements from the Permanent Editorial Board (“PEB”).  
While a PEB comment on the topic would not hurt, it is not clear 
that the pronouncement would filter down to the courts in small 
matters, particularly if small cases are administered like civil law 
cases. 
 
187 Gabriel, supra note 184, at 494 (suggesting that most opposition had been 
eliminated in the drafting process but that left revised Article 2 with no champion). 
To be sure, the UCC process is not immune to capture and influence at the drafting 
stage; for example, witness the split of the Uniform Computer Information 
Transactions Act (UCITA) into a separate project. See Brian D. McDonald, The 
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 461,  
462 (2001). 
188 Opposition to Revised Article 2’s attempt to address “information,” which 
includes computer software, by industry groups appears to be one reason for the 
failure of the amendment, among many, even though the revision process dropped 
treatment of software licensing in 1999. See Miller, What Can We Learn, supra note 
97, at 474. 
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VI. THE WAY FORWARD 
Llewellyn himself stated that a byproduct of the grand 
codificatory act is that “errors in it, if any, are rather to be suffered 
than amended, over very considerable periods” of time.189  While 
the idea of suffering over a very considerable period of time may 
be descriptively accurate, as a normative matter, it is questionable 
whether it is acceptable to wait.190  It is sometimes said that justice 
delayed is justice denied.  What should be done about a problem 
for which a correction was proposed through the amendment 
process by 1999, included in a reconstituted amendment in 2003, 
which was withdrawn in 2011?191  The end of 2019 approaches.  It 
did not seem to help that the ambiguity was identified in the 
academic literature in at least 2000.192  No correction is pending 
through the usual channels of law reform, which is not surprising.  
Stewardship of the law requires that some step be taken in light 
of growing income inequality. 
A restatement project does not seem like the answer, though 
it would not hurt.  Restatements of law exhibit a trend toward 
downsizing the scope of the project undertaken.  In the commercial 
law field, a current example is the project on the Restatement of 
Consumer Contracts (“RCC”), which is proceeding in lieu of a new 
restatement of the entire field of contracts.193  Unfortunately, that 
project does not address deposit return calculations.194  The 
problem with enlisting the draft RCC in the corrective effort rests 
with the purely statutory nature of this problem.  It is a UCC 
drafting problem.  The rationale the draft RCC uses for addressing 
certain contract formation issues in consumer contracting is that 
the problems addressed are, first and foremost, common law issues  
 
 
189 Llewellyn, supra note 179, at 561. 
190 Sometimes Llewellyn and other legal realists, as well as the UCC project itself, 
are accused of being amoral. To be sure, Llewellyn and others advocated for the UCC 
on the grounds that it was largely non-political in character. See Danzig, supra  
note 138, at 627–28. This stance does not, however, create an argument for inaction 
when an injustice has been identified. 
191 U.C.C. 2003 AMENDMENTS TO ARTICLE 2 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
2017) (Amendments Proposed in 2003 and Withdrawn from the Official Text in 2011). 
192 See Pettit, supra note 39, at 1488, 1503. 
193 Letter from Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr. to Am. Law Inst. Council Members (Jan. 
10, 2018), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/13-ali-comments-council-draft-4.pdf 
[hereinafter draft RCC]. 
194 Id. 
2019] SOCIAL JUSTICE AND DEPOSIT RETURN 415 
and not UCC issues, though clearly they are related to the UCC.195  
No plausible case can be made that the deposit return calculation 
problem is anything other than statutory. 
Following the rules for restatements would be 
straightforward if one focused a new restatement project on 
statutory consumer issues.196  First, the meager case law shows a 
majority rule following the alternative approach.  Second, the 
trend follows the additive method, which should not be followed 
because of the third and fourth considerations.  Third, the rule 
that best leads to coherence in the law is the alternative approach 
or the context sensitive method because it follows the general rule 
for damages computation, which aims at compensation for loss, 
rather than a provision for premium or penalty.  Fourth, the 
alternative approach or the context sensitive method is the more 
desirable rule, particularly in times of increasing income 
inequality, because it reduces outcomes producing unjust 
enrichment. 
There is no reason to think a restatement would receive the 
required attention, so perhaps this is not a true missed 
opportunity.  This Article may be a success at multiple levels: if it 
leads courts to apply a context sensitive method to deny a 
premium or a penalty, if it leads to a correction in a future 
restatement, or if it leads to a PEB Commentary.  Perhaps the best 
solution is the alternative of pushing for individual amendment to 
§ 2-718, orchestrated on a state by state basis, without national 
coordination through the ALI and ULC.  The facts lead to the 
conclusion, very reluctantly, that state by state amendment is the 
best course for this problem. 
As preface, the suggestion to replace fifty gridlocked state 
legislative processes with fifty other potentially gridlocked 
processes—but without elaborate institutional support—may 
appear crazy or romantic.  In defense, one can make a practical 
case for a unique non-uniform amendment in New York alone,  
 
 
195 In fact, a good case can be made that the Draft RCC mischaracterizes a UCC 
issue as a common law issue in order to allow consideration of contract formation 
issues for which statutory reform has failed. That, however, is another project for 
another day. 
196 The justification for such an examination of statutes impacting consumers 
could be grounded in the Restatement Second treatment of the statute of frauds. For 
an outline of the requirements for a restatement, see AM. LAW INST., A HANDBOOK 
FOR ALI REPORTERS AND THOSE WHO REVIEW THEIR WORK 4–6 (2015) (presenting 
excerpt of the Revised Style Manual approved by the ALI Council in January 2015). 
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which would effectively redirect that jurisdiction away from the 
recent, but misguided, case law.  Effort should be spent in New 
York, at the very least. 
At a more theoretical level, one can understand the second 
design failure of the cumbersome amendment process as not a core 
failure, at least from the perspective of Llewellyn.  Creating a 
grand codificatory act did not have, as part of its purpose, the 
creation of a legal device that would be responsive to an ongoing 
democratic process.  Indeed, Llewellyn told us repeatedly that any 
of the various uniform sales acts, federal or state, would rarely be 
amended.  These projects, in this sense, are conceived as 
antidemocratic, even though the product of an initial democratic 
process.  This setup leaves open space for a democratic or popular 
response to the codificatory act, if needed.  Justice lives outside the 
grand gesture. 
Llewellyn, together with Hart and Sacks, were part of a 
handful of scholars who seriously studied the legislative process.197  
“Hart and Sacks were preeminently concerned with the law as a 
vehicle of growth and with legislatures as maximizers of social 
utilities.”198  For them, ideally, the lawmaker would actively shape 
society for its betterment.  In such a view, a lawmaker should not 
sit around for decades allowing constituent suffering due to a 
drafting error in a grand codificatory act. 
In contrast, for Llewellyn, the primary task for the lawmaker 
was to use a kind of situation sense to identify patterns and 
practices appropriate to particular situations.  The life situations 
of a particular time and place suggest contours for an appropriate 
law—law that was immanent in a particular fact-situation.  The 
lawmaker merely needs to articulate it.  Indeed, for Llewellyn, it 
was probably of secondary importance—or, perhaps, even a 
bother—that legislators performed this role.199  The legislator’s 
role was passive, not active.  The fine tuning and the promotion of 
 
197 See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, at iii (1958). 
198 Danzig, supra note 138, at 624. 
199 Id. It is not germane to the point made here to engage in the debate over 
whether, and to what extent, Danzig is correct about the degree of amorality in 
Llewellyn’s approach. See Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl 
Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465, 468 n.13 (1987) (disputing 
Danzig’s characterization of Llewellyn’s thought). What is required is that a moral 
stance be taken against the prospect of a long and extended period of suffering. See, 
e.g., HART & SACKS, supra note 197, at 102–07 (arguing that the promotion of human 
welfare should be a part of legal decision making). 
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justice would be left to common law-trained judges in courts.  
Despite the gridlock of established legislative avenues for 
amendment,200 if one adopts the Hart and Sacks view of the 
purpose of lawmaking—as requiring consideration of moral 
imperatives rather than of anthropological observations—it 
suggests legislators push for change, against the odds and through 
nonstandard means, even if standing alone.  Sometimes, 
uniformity may be a false god standing in the way of progress. 
Though non-uniform amendments to the UCC generally are 
disfavored as conflicting with the mission of the UCC to be 
“uniform,”201 some states have adopted non-uniform amendments 
without any negative impact.202  Importantly, this step is 
recommended only after the uniform amendment process has 
failed.  Indeed, the first stated purpose of the UCC is to “simplify, 
clarify, and modernize the law governing commercial 
transactions.”203  This purpose is frustrated when the traditional 
amendment process fails.  Given this failure, one might accept 
some shortcomings associated with non-uniformity, though as 
discussed below, non-uniformity poses no real risks in this case.  
Indeed, promotion of the first value of “clarity” may require 
subordination of the value of “uniformity.”204 
The need for a non-uniform amendment process to fix UCC 
§ 2-718(2) and (3) is not related to the usual set of problems 
infecting a uniform law process.  When a uniform law process fails 
effectively to protect consumer interests, the failure is in part 
attributed to the absence of effective consumer representation in 
the uniform law process.205  However, that does not appear to be 
 
200 This study shows that law reform takes a long time. The original amendment 
to protect defaulting buyers took over forty years and that was in a single state—New 
York. The initial UCC project took over twenty years, depending on how one counts. 
The failure of revised Article 2 took over twenty years. 
201 See U.C.C. § 1-103(a)(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018); Murray, 
supra note 162, at 594 (“The need for uniformity in a commercial law statute is a sine 
qua non of its existence.”); accord W. DAVID SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES: THE LATE 
20TH-CENTURY REFORMATION OF CONTRACT LAW 138 (1996). 
202 This goes against the stated purpose in UCC § 1-103(a)(3) “to make uniform 
the law among the various jurisdictions.” 
203 U.C.C. § 1-103(a)(1). 
204 This is particularly true when the hope exists that uniformity may be restored 
by widespread adoption of the non-uniform amendment. The ALI and the ULC  
may have a vast apparatus designed to achieve uniformity, but they do not have a 
monopoly on uniformity. 
205 See Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform 
Laws Process: Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 83, 
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the case here as Revised Article 2 contained the technical fix 
required to eliminate the penalty.  The problem, rather, was that 
a good provision was eliminated when the overall Article 2 revision 
project failed. 
A large and complex literature discusses problems of uniform 
law projects, which are beyond the present task to engage fully.206  
However, a brief defense of a non-uniform amendment is 
warranted. 
In a taxonomy of non-uniform UCC amendments, three 
different types stand out as unlikely to create the sort of 
differences which destroy the rationale for a uniform code.  In the 
first camp are amendments to fix obvious problems, particularly 
where case law developed a solution.207  “Obvious problems” are 
problems caused by poor drafting, not those created by use of 
flexible and open-textured terms.  Often, case law uncovers these 
types of ambiguity.  If the non-uniform amendment operates in 
parallel to a developed case law solution, there is little room for 
conflict or confusion.  The Massachusetts amendment to UCC 
§ 2-207 governing the battle of the forms is of this type.208  
Massachusetts amended its version of § 2-207(2) expressly to cover 
both “different” and “additional” terms,209 a move generally arrived 
at by case law.210  This type of small fix merely steers parties and 
courts in the right direction without the need to consider precedent 
 
126 (1993). Consumer group opposition—because the revision did not go far  
enough—may have been part of the problem. 
206 See, e.g., F. Stephen Knippenberg & William J. Woodward, Jr., Uniformity and 
Efficiency in the Uniform Commercial Code: A Partial Research Agenda, 45 BUS. LAW. 
2519, 2524 (1990). 
207 For a discussion of types of amendments faced by the UCC editorial board 
early in the adoption process, see Robert Braucher, The Uniform Commercial  
Code—A Third Look?, 14 W. RES. L. REV. 7, 11 (1962). Professor Braucher writes, 
“First and easiest is the correction of obvious error. Second is the resolution of 
ambiguity disclosed by judicial decision.” Id. 
208 MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 106, § 2-207 (1991). 
209 The model version of the UCC does not include the word “different” in § 2-
207(2) governing a battle of the forms situation. Massachusetts added the term 
“different” in its version of the UCC to clarify the ambiguity created when § 2-708(1) 
refers to “different” and “additional” terms but § 2-207(2) refers only to “additional” 
terms. See generally John L. Utz, More on the Battle of the Forms: The Treatment of 
“Different” Terms Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 UCC L.J. 103 (1983) 
(describing the drafting problem created by omission of the word “different”). 
Michigan and Montana follow Massachusetts in adding the word “different.” See 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 440.2207 (West 2019); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-207(2) 
(West 2019); HAWKLAND, supra note 14, at 181. 
210 See, e.g., Northrop Corp. v. Litronic Indus., 29 F.3d 1173, 1175 (7th Cir. 1994). 
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and secondary authority.211  Such an amendment should reduce 
future transaction costs.  It does not lead to unfair surprise or the 
type of inconsistency, which might cause problems for interstate 
transactions or the national economy. 
In the second camp are non-uniform amendments, which 
address matters of particularly local concern.212  An example is the 
non-uniform amendment in Nebraska to address sales of grain by 
non-merchants.213  Another is non-uniform amendments relating 
to cooperative homes in New York.214  These changes actually 
reflect a strength of having fifty different state laws rather than a 
single federal sales act as originally planned for the UCC.215  
Importantly, the local nature of the transactions addressed in 
deposit return cases means that the non-uniformity is unlikely to 
interfere with interstate transactions or the operation of a 
national economy.  This statement is true even though the local 
 
211 Not everyone would agree with this characterization of the small statutory fix. 
Some suggest that the change contravenes the “knock out” rule developed in most 
jurisdictions. See Burnham, supra note 7, at 526 n.29. Generally, that is an argument 
for another day, though Ionics, Inc. v. Elmwood Sensors, Inc. may support the view 
that the drafting change is minor. 110 F.3d 184, 188–89 (1st Cir. 1997), overturning 
Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962). If not, we may have 
an unfortunate instance of a clarifying amendment which fails to clarify. See 
Braucher, supra note 207, at 11 (“Third, amendments which do not clarify have 
sometimes been made for the purpose of clarification.”). 
212 See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of 
Uniform State Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 141 (1996) (suggesting that one cost of 
uniform laws may be the elimination of beneficial local variation). Professor Braucher 
called a local variation of this sort “regrettable” but indicated that it posed “no problem 
for the national sponsors.” Braucher, supra note 207, at 10. 
213 Nebraska included a change to the UCC Article 2 statute of frauds, § 2-201, to 
specifically address the case of transactions between a merchant and a buyer or seller 
of grain who is not a merchant. See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. U.C.C. § 2-201(2)(b) (2019). 
South Dakota adopted a similar non-uniform amendment. See HAWKLAND, supra  
note 14, at 181. 
214 These appear in New York’s version of Article 9 and not Article 2. Oddly, New 
York law treats co-op shares as “goods” under Article 2 pursuant to case law decision. 
Silverman v. Alcoa Plaza Associates, 37 A.D.2d 166, 323 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1st Dep’t 1971). 
215 To be complete, a federal sales act would not have applied to most small 
transactions which are intrastate because the federal government would not have had 
authority under the commerce power of the United States Constitution to regulate 
those transactions. See George C. Bogert, The Proposed Federal Sales Act, 26 VA. L. 
REV. 572, 584 (1940). Rather, the hope for the federal sales act process was that states 
would pass parallel legislation out of concerns to conform. See Llewellyn, supra  
note 179, at 562 (expressing the hope that new state legislation would conform to a 
federal sales act). There is no reason, in principal, why a state law could not act as a 
role model for other state laws, just as the proponents of the federal sales act project 
anticipated a federal law would act as a model for intrastate transactions governed by 
state law. 
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nature of the transaction arises solely because it is intrastate—in 
most cases—and not because of some unique aspect of the local 
economy such as a concentration of farming or cooperative home 
ownership. 
In the third camp are non-uniform amendments, which 
address public policy concerns of a particular state.  An example 
is Florida’s decision to eliminate UCC § 2-725 of Article 2, which 
governs the statute of limitations.  In most jurisdictions, the model 
version of Article 2 , which permits the shortening of a statute of 
limitations for suit in a sale of goods transaction, was adopted.216  
Florida, however, has a public policy against shortening the 
statute of limitations.217  Accordingly, Florida’s version of Article 2 
simply omits § 2-725 altogether. 
In this example, uniformity may be a negative by promoting a 
“race to the bottom” structure in the law by allowing business 
interests to avoid liability for breach of warranty claims to an 
extent deemed unfair.218  Rather than yield to this “race to the 
bottom,” the Florida legislators followed their better angels, 
declining to place uniformity ahead of justice concerns, or so one 
might surmise.  Interestingly, this view of the Florida public policy 
is indirectly supported by proposed revisions to Article 2, which 
would have prevented the shortening of the statute of limitations 
in a consumer transaction.219  Such a non-uniform provision might 
be justified by appeals to fairness, whether or not grounded in 
considerations of efficiency.  In short, justice trumps uniformity.220 
 
216 See, e.g., N.Y. U.C.C. § 2–725 (McKinney 2019). 
217 See Burroughs Corp. v. Suntogs of Miami, Inc., 472 So. 2d 1166, 1167–68  
(Fla. 1985). 
218 See Janger, supra note 11, at 579–80; cf. William L.Cary, Federalism and 
Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 665–66 (1974) 
(introducing the idea of a “race to the bottom”). 
219 U.C.C. § 2-725 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, Proposed Amendments 
to Article 2 Sales 2002) (Amendments Proposed in 2002 and Withdrawn from the 
Official text in 2011). 
220 Different statutes of limitation, however, have a dark side: they invite parties 
to negotiate over which state’s version of the UCC applies to a transaction. Professor 
Burnham has noted the irony of parties negotiating over which state’s Uniform 
Commercial Code will provide the law. Burnham, supra note 7, at 526. Public policy 
should have priority over uniformity even when it creates a downside. Addressing 
deposit return calculations is one of those fortunate cases where a tradeoff need not 
be made. Another example where justice appears to have prevailed over uniformity is 
the Connecticut UCC, in which that state’s legislature addressed electronic devices 
which disable car ignitions—a technique used in subprime auto lending to facilitate 
repossessions and to “encourage” payments known as “electronic self-help.” See CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-9-609 (2001). See generally Michael Corkery & Jessica  
Silver-Greenberg, Miss a Payment? Good Luck Moving That Car, N.Y. TIMES  
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An amendment to UCC § 2-718 to eliminate the premium or 
penalty is firmly in the third “public policy” camp even though 
elements of a technical amendment and a local amendment are 
present.  Adoption of a public policy to eliminate the default rule 
creating the penalty has particular appeal in the current economic 
environment on fairness and justice grounds.  A state could decide 
to eliminate the premium or penalty without doing violence to the 
general project of creating uniformity in state law while promoting 
a more efficient and just law in this case.  Several reasons support 
this view. 
First, on the analysis contained above, an amendment to UCC 
§ 2-718 to eliminate the premium or penalty is merely a technical 
amendment, reaffirming what the law already provides as 
elucidated by the context sensitive method.  However, in New 
York, where the fix is most needed, it does more work even though, 
arguably, it is technically just confirming Neri.  The amendment 
is promajoritarian in that it reaffirms legislative intent. 
Second, the interpretation of the law needs to change in form, 
but not in substance, to prevent courts from making a mistaken 
application of law, particularly in small matters due to the 
transaction cost limitations.  In the small case, courts may treat 
the UCC like a civil code, applying the law by a surface read of the 
statute.  In this milieu, in practice, the commercial code is not 
functioning in a common law system with a robust body of 
precedent as envisioned by its authors.  Were the law functioning 
as designed, courts would have corrected the problem in New York 
by now.  Reducing mistakes should lower transaction costs. 
Third, in Florida, Missouri, Tennessee, and Utah, the 
amendment is merely protective of results under existing case law, 
guarding against a future court treating the UCC like a civil code 
and arriving at the wrong result or being led astray by errant 
secondary literature.221  In New York, an amendment will provide 
a course correction to prevent lower courts from using the additive 
method against the binding precedent of Neri.  Elsewhere, the 
change is simply good statutory hygiene. 
Fourth, the cases in which the change matters are local, 
intrastate transactions involving consumers or small businesses.  
These matters are cases where non-uniformity does not matter 
greatly. 
 
(Sept. 24, 2014, 9:33 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/09/24/miss-a-payment-
good-luck-moving-that-car/ (discussing starter interrupt devices). 
221 See supra notes 55–56. 
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Fifth, the change clarifies a calculation consistent with the 
general theory of contract damages and does not work a change in 
doctrine.  Consider, for example, eliminating the requirement that 
consideration support an amendment to a contract.222  In so doing, 
it reinforces the evolution of contract damages towards 
recognizing restitution rights, an evolution specifically intended to 
prevent unjust enrichment.  Indeed, the original New York law 
revision process which resulted in today’s UCC § 2-718 was 
motivated to prevent buyers from unjustly enriching sellers and to 
provide equal treatment between defaulting buyers and defaulting 
sellers. 
Contrast the three relatively benign examples of 
non-uniformity offered above with non-uniform changes to the 
scope of the UCC.  For example, the Oklahoma exclusion of 
“information” from the definition of “goods”223 to deny computer 
software licenses coverage under Article 2—when UCC case law 
generally goes the other way224—is destructive of uniformity of an 
important kind, going against case law and complicating conflict 
of law rules.225  This observation is true even though the Oklahoma 
amendment may be correct, and case law wrong, as a matter of 
statutory construction.226 
Given the failure of the revision project for Article 2, a populist 
program of revision may be necessary to save the UCC from 
obsolescence.227  Careful selection of clauses for a populist revision 
 
222 See U.C.C. § 2-205 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018). 
223 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-105 (West 2006). 
224 Holly K. Towle, Enough Already: It Is Time To Acknowledge That UCC Article 
2 Does Not Apply to Software and Other Information, 52 S. TEX. L. REV. 531,  
532 (2011). 
225 The annotations to the Oklahoma law suggest that, if a transaction includes 
goods and information, the UCC may not apply to the information portion of the 
contract. 
More specifically, if a transaction is not fully within Article 2 but includes 
information and goods, the article does not apply to the part involving 
information, including informational rights in it and creation or modification 
of it, or, as indicated above, to the media on which the information is 
contained. 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-105 cmt. 1 (2006). This annotation invites application 
of the “gravamen” test to a mixed transaction. In other types of mixed transactions, a 
court typically applies the predominate purpose test. This non-uniform amendment 
muddles up conflict of law rules used to determine choice of law in hybrid or mixed 
transactions. 
226 Towle, supra note 224, at 534, 536. 
227 See Burnham, supra note 7, at 530 (suggesting that, absent amendment, 
Article 2 may become as quaint and obsolete as the Field Code); accord Miller, A True 
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may update and clarify the code without causing a failure of its 
overall mission to create uniformity in the law, providing a 
stop-gap until the engines of institutional reform reawaken. 
CONCLUSION 
The answer to Professor Murray’s question of who is 
responsible for an effective Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code may well be, “we are.”228  But “we” does not necessarily mean 
the ALI and the ULC, as suggested by Professor Murray.229  
Rather, in the case of small drafting matters, an alternative “we” 
might be an effort led by contract law professors in each state 
advocating for law reform, perhaps enlisting an army of students 
in a teachable moment.  A grassroots effort might achieve a 
positive change in law where more formal avenues of law reform 
have failed for almost twenty years.230  Widespread success would 
show that the ULC does not have a monopoly on uniformity. 
 
Story, supra note 97, at 143 (fretting over “the irreversible erosion of perhaps the most 
significant state law in U.S. history”). 
228 Murray, supra note 8, at 129. 
229 In a best case scenario, the ALI and the ULC would initiate a radically 
downsized UCC amendment process to identify, pass, and push to ratify the 
non-controversial UCC revisions lost when the grand amendment failed. This is not a 
simple case of institutional players playing badly. Quite the contrary. The ALI and 
ULC made available several needed amendments reforming damage awards to make 
the calculations more just. In this camp, I would include not only the proposed changes 
to § 2-718, but also the revisions increasing the dollar amount for application of the 
statute of frauds and allowing a seller to recover consequential damages. Providing 
consequential damages for a seller historically equalized the treatment for sellers and 
buyers, much as the long ago efforts aimed to equalize treatment of deposits for 
defaulting buyers and defaulting sellers begun in 1942 in New York. A system which 
only addresses the grand amendment is designed to produce costly failures when 
failure occurs. 
230 Enlisting the academic community was part of Llewellyn’s strategy for 
passage of the UCC. See Wiseman, supra note 199, at 486 (noting “Llewellyn’s next 
step was to mobilize the academic legal community for modernization”). Persons 
interested in this project should understand its modest goals. The change will not 
prevent consumers from paying a premium when they sign an agreement containing 
a liquidated damages clause. Clarifying application of UCC § 2-718 (2) and (3) imposes 
no mandatory restrictions on the substance of a contract. The “reform” suggested here 
does not limit the discretion of a business by setting boundaries to permitted contract 
terms. Most consumer layaway plans offered by major retailers include liquidated 
damages clauses. They are not subject to default rules. The default rules governing 
deposit returns apply when a non-defaulting seller has failed to make appropriate 
plans or to draft a more complete agreement. This is likely to occur in more informal 
settings or in single transactions, rather than in programmatic ones. For a description 
of cases in which businessmen may fail to make appropriate plans, see Stewart 
Macaulay, The Use and Non-Use of Contracts in the Manufacturing Industry, 9 PRAC. 
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Three options exist for accomplishing an amendment to UCC 
§ 2-718, depending on the substantive result desired.  One simple 
approach would be to adopt the version of § 2-718 contained in the 
2003 Revised Article 2.  This option has the advantage, from the 
standpoint of a defaulting buyer, of eliminating entirely the 
possibility of a deposit being used to pay any premium or penalty.  
Further, it has the blessing of the ALI and the ULC.  It has the 
disadvantage in live cases of requiring a trial to determine actual 
damages when the existing language might lead a non-defaulting 
seller simply to accept the statutory amount.  Additionally, it 
works a change in the law in those cases where the base retention 
amount exceeds actual damages. 
A second option is to follow the lead of North Carolina and add 
a subsection (2)(c) to § 2-718(2).  The North Carolina version reads: 
“at the election of the seller in the case of a layaway contract, the 
aggregate payments received by seller from buyer under the 
contract or fifty dollars ($50.00), whichever is smaller.”231 
The North Carolina amendment was passed in 1993.232  The 
section addresses only the context of a layaway plan, though its 
express terms do not limit its application to consumers.233  As 
applied, subsection (c) operates to create a new base retention 
amount in the maximum amount of $50 for layaway plans.  This 
provision makes the penalty or premium a small issue even for 
persons of modest means.  The problem with the actual drafting is 
that it includes the troublesome phrase, “at the election of the 
seller,” making it hard to determine what this language is for, 
unless it is to neuter the provision.234  No rational seller would 
limit itself to a $50 retention if it had the option of a $500 retention 
under (2)(b).  If this language were eliminated, and application of 
 
LAW. 13, 14–18 (1963). Nevertheless, the correction will help some and move the 
expressive function of the law toward justice and fairness. 
231 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-2-718(2)(c) (West 1993). 
232 Act of July 14, 1993, ch. 340 (S.B. 709), 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws (amending the 
North Carolina UCC to clarify and modify the law on layaway contracts). 
233 The addition to North Carolina General Statutes § 25-2-718(2)(c) operates in 
conjunction with a definition of “layaway contract” added to North Carolina General 
Statutes § 25-2-106:  
A “layaway contract” means any contract for the sale of goods in which the 
seller agrees with the purchaser, in consideration for the purchaser’s 
payment of a deposit, down payment, or similar initial payment, to hold 
identified goods for future delivery upon the purchaser’s payment of a 
specified additional amount, whether in installments or otherwise. 
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-2-106(1) (West 1993). 
234 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-2-718(2)(c) (West 1993). 
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subsection (2)(c) were mandatory for layaway plans, consumers 
would be protected.  Properly drafted, such an approach addresses 
the bulk of the social justice concerns raised by current UCC 
§ 2-718(2) and (3).  Given the statute’s drafting, and the absence 
of case law or helpful official comment, it is hard to discern the 
state of the law or whether persons of modest means currently are 
protected in North Carolina.  The point, however, is that such a 
drafting approach could be made to work. 
The third option, recommended here, merely clarifies existing 
law to eliminate the additive method as a calculation option.  This 
option has the benefit of eliminating the premium or penalty in 
the most egregious cases while retaining an incentive for a seller 
to merely accept the basic retention amount without going to trial.  
This approach has the further benefit of reaffirming the law as it 
was intended to be applied while changing nothing else; in other 
words, it leaves the small statutory liquidated damages provision 
intact, eliminating the need to argue over whether it promotes 
judicial economy.  Thus, as a practical matter such an amendment 
should be easily sold to state legislatures.  The suggested 
amendment language appears below. 
SUGGESTED AMENDMENT TO SECTION 2-718 OF THE 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: 
* * * 
(2) Where the seller justifiably withholds delivery of goods 
because of the buyer’s breach, the buyer is entitled to restitution 
of any amount by which the sum of his payments exceeds . . .  
(b) . . . twenty per cent of the value of the total performance 
for which the buyer is obligated under the contract or $500, 
whichever is smaller. 
(3) The buyer’s right to restitution under subsection (2) is 
subject to offset to the extent that the seller establishes 
(a) a right to recover damages in excess of the amount 
retained under subsection (2)(b) under the provisions of this 
Article other than subsection (1), and 
(b) the amount or value of any benefits received by the  
buyer directly or indirectly by reason of the contract. 
 
* * * 
 
